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ABSTRACT 
 In this dissertation, I study underinvestment and overinvestment theories by 
examining the value creation and destruction in hospitality firms in three separate but 
coherent and cohesive research papers. In the first study, I analyze the extent to which 
financial constraints (underinvestment) and corporate governance (overinvestment) affect 
hotel firms’ value around acquisition announcements. In addition to the traditional form 
of corporate structure (i.e., C-corporation), hotel firms extensively adopt the 
organizational forms of franchising and REIT, which might affect under- and 
overinvestment problems. Nonetheless, little is known whether capital investments create 
or reduce value for hotel-REITs and franchising hotel firms. The results show that 
acquisitions are viewed as overinvestments in franchising and hotel-REIT firms, 
suggesting that hotel firms adopt franchising and REIT to reduce overinvestment and 
agency problems. Although the average effect of financial constraints is larger for 
financially constrained firms, weak corporate governance seems to be more problematic 
than financial constraints for hotel firms. In the second study, I examine the sensitivity of 
capital and franchising investments to internal funds in the hotel industry. While 
financially constrained firms rely on internal funds to reduce underinvestment problems, 
they may also rely on franchising to expand their investments. However, if firms are not 
constrained, internal funds may lead to overinvestment problems and franchising may 
exacerbate problems with empire building. By estimating the investment-cash flow
vi	
sensitivity, I find that the availability of internal funds reduces underinvestment problems 
more than it causes overinvestment problems. Furthermore, both financial constraints and 
agency costs lead firms to expand through franchising. In the third study, I investigate the 
relationship between marginal cash and firm value and the extent to which franchising, 
financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this relationship in hotel firms. The 
results show that cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms relative to 
unconstrained firms, while it is less valuable for poorly-governed firms relative to well-
governed firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the marginal value of 
cash than weak corporate governance. While franchising could solve underinvestment 
problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 Most hospitality firms adopt the organizational form of franchising business 
investment model, which requires little or no capital investment. Yet, they also undertake 
investments that require substantial capital investment such as development and 
acquisition of hotel properties and mergers. The quote by Marriott sums up the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the hospitality industry in terms of adopted business 
model, and investment and financing strategies. 
 “Our emphasis on long-term management contracts and 
franchising tends to provide more stable earnings in periods of 
economic softness, while adding new hotels to our system generates 
growth, typically with little or no investment by the company…. We, 
along with owners and franchisees, continue to invest in our brands by 
means of new, refreshed, and reinvented properties, new room and 
public space designs, and enhanced amenities and technology 
offerings.” 
 It is clearly stated in the Marriott’s management discussion and analysis of 
financial condition statements above that franchising and management contracts are 
chosen to expand the business. 
		2 
 
 The hotel industry has different characteristics than other industries given the fact 
that it adopts franchising business model extensively for investment and expansion with 
no or little capital investment. Furthermore, unlike other industries, such as 
manufacturing industries, service is the main product in the hotel industry. The intangible 
and perishable attributes of the hotel industry’s end-product; service hinder the mass 
production and storage of the product for future use, as opposed to other industries, such 
as manufacturing industries, where the end-product is tangible and durable. Nonetheless, 
investments in the hotel industry requires substantial capital spending for delivering the 
service, which makes hotel business, similar to manufacturing industries, a capital-
intensive industry. While the firms in the hotel industry undertake investments that 
require substantial capital, such as mergers and acquisitions, which are prevalent 
corporate strategies in the hotel industry (Canina, Kim, & Ma, 2010), they extensively 
rely on franchising for expansion and growth. Typically, franchisors do not need 
substantial capital resources for franchising investments, which could be used as an 
alternative investment tool when franchisors lack necessary capital to expand the 
business (Hunt, 1973). Furthermore, hotel investments may take a large amount of time 
to build a new hotel project considering the fact that developing a new hotel division 
requires not only financing the project but also requires meeting local standards and 
approvals, such as zoning, land use, and site development. However, it may be difficult 
for a firm to simultaneously operationalize these investments national and/or global level 
and reach economies of scale. Therefore, in an era of global economy, franchising could 
be an efficient investment model for firms in the service industry to rapidly meet the 
		3 
increased demands of fast-growing economy. Additionally, the majority of the hotel 
investments consist of properties, which depreciate in value by time and require 
maintenance, refurbishment, and renewal; hence, they require periodic capital 
expenditures to maintain the service quality. Hotel guests continue to demand enhanced 
hotel facilities and amenities, which necessitate a continuing investment in innovative 
and advanced technologies. Therefore, the high level of competition in local, regional, 
and global scale in the hotel industry may put hotel companies out of business if they 
cannot provide the contemporary facilities and amenities. Furthermore, hotel firms aim to 
increase their market shares by building a recognized brand name, which requires a rapid 
growth by increasing the sales within the existing hotel properties and/or 
developing/acquisitions of new hotels. Similar to franchising investments, acquisitions 
also allow firms to expand rapidly in both domestic and foreign markets, as the 
acquisition strategy eliminates the time necessary for developing a new hotel project from 
the ground. However, franchising is especially beneficial for franchisors in international 
expansions because it enables firms to expand into foreign markets with bearing little or 
no capital investment risk, in which the risk is shifted to the franchisee in exchange for 
the franchisor’s expertise and brand name (Alon, Ni, & Wang, 2012). 
 There are two plausible theories that explain why firms adopt franchising as an 
investment tool. First, capital scarcity theory posits that firms adopt franchising as an 
alternative to company-owned investment because raising external finance through debt 
or equity markets makes the net present value (NPV, hereafter) of the company-owned 
unit investment negative. Thus, firms with growth prospects expand through franchising 
in order to fund the growth because they do not need to allocate substantial capital for 
		4 
expansion through franchising (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969; Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 
1968-1969). Along the same line, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there are 
informational asymmetries between firms and outside investors, and raising capital to 
undertake investments beyond the internal funds could be costly. In other words, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) put forwards the idea that if internal funds are not sufficient to 
undertake a positive NPV project, firms will bypass the project because raising external 
funds increases the project’s cost to a level that makes the positive NPV project negative. 
Thus, firms face underinvestment problem due to financial constraints since they cannot 
undertake all value-increasing projects. Accordingly, the organizational form of 
franchising could be a solution to reduce underinvestment problem for hotel firms that 
face asymmetric information problems. 
 Second, agency theory asserts that firms adopt franchising to eliminate agency 
costs that arise due to incentive conflicts between unit managers and the firm (Brickley & 
Dark, 1987; Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991). In other words, firms can eliminate the 
agency costs generated by separation of ownership and control through franchising 
because franchised units are compensated by the residual claims of their particular units, 
while a fixed salary compensates unit managers. However, the agency theory argues that 
franchised units are not free of agency costs, and thus a conflict of interests may arise 
between franchised units and the firm. In general, the conflict of interests between the 
franchisees and the firm arise from franchisees’ incentives to free ride on the trademark 
(free riding) by providing low quality service to non-repeat customers, whereas 
disparities between unit managers and the firm may arise from managerial shirking and 
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perquisites taking (Lafontaine, 1992). Although firms can monitor the unit managers’ 
performances, the monitoring cost is so high that it makes the investment unprofitable.  
 While a number of studies examined the determinants of investing in franchises, 
the effects of franchising on hotel firms’ overall value, on hotel firms’ marginal value of 
cash, and the relation between internal funds and hotel firms’ investments along the lines 
of financial constraints and exposure to empire building have not been studied at least in 
the English published literature. Nicolau (2002) analyzes the announcement of the 
opening new hotel effects on firm’s performance, and Graf (2009) examines the effects of 
hotel entry mode choices (franchise, management contract, and company-owned hotel) to 
international markets on firm’s performance. However, previous studies that test the 
capital scarcity theory consider all franchising firms as having external financing 
problems at the same level. Therefore, empirical studies, which examine the capital 
scarcity theory of franchising, lack serious identification problems regarding the capital 
scarcity of the firms because the degree of financial constraints may vary greatly across 
firms. A method that classifies firms as constrained and unconstrained based on the 
degree of financial constraints is necessary to test whether firms adopt franchising due 
capital scarcity. Beginning with the seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, 
and Poterba (1988) that links investment-cash flow sensitivity to financial constraints, a 
number of financial constraint indices have been developed to identify firms’ financial 
constraint levels (see e.g., Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Hennessy & Whited, 
2007; Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo, 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006). The classification 
based on these indices are expected to resolve the methodological flaw in previous 
empirical studies that examine the capital scarcity theory of franchising by showing the 
		6 
extent to which unavailability of internal funds lead constrained and unconstrained firms 
to expand through franchising. Furthermore, former studies do not investigate to what 
extent franchising affect the underinvestment and overinvestment problems in the hotel 
industry. Questions such as why firms adopt the franchising business investment model, 
how is firm value affected along the dimensions of franchising and capital investment, 
and the extent to which financial constraints (underinvestment) and exposure to empire 
building (overinvestment) affect firms’ investments and firm value remain to be 
answered.  
 The capital scarcity theory of franchising and asymmetric information problems 
suggests that financial constraints lead hotel firms to adopt the franchising business 
investment model. Thus, the following proposition is offered for testing purposes:  
Proposition 1: availability of internal funds lead hotel firms to undertake capital 
investments. 
Proposition 2:  under- and overinvestment problems moderate the relationship 
between internal funds and capital investments. 
 The agency theory of franchising suggests that firms adopt franchising when the 
agency costs that are associated with the disparity between unit managers and the firm are 
higher than the agency costs that are associated with the conflict of interests between 
franchised units and the firm. Therefore, the following proposition is offered based on the 
agency theory of franchising for testing purposes: 
Proposition 3: monitoring costs of unit managers lead hotel firms to adopt the 
franchising business investment model.   
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 One of the main objectives of the firm is to maximize shareholders’ value, and the 
value is maximized when the optimal investment level is reached. Accordingly, 
deviations from the optimal investment level deteriorate firm value. An investment below 
(underinvestment) or above (overinvestment) the optimal investment level deteriorates 
firm value. While the irrelevance theorem developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
postulates that firms’ investment decisions are independent from financing decisions, a 
stream of literature finds support for the underinvestment problem described by Myers 
and Majluf (1984) showing that financially constrained firms rely on internal funds for 
investments more than unconstrained firms (see e.g., Lamont et al., 2001). In addition to 
expanding through franchising, hotel firms make investments that require substantial 
capital spending, such as developing/building and acquisitions of hotels to reach their 
optimum investment level and maximize firm value. This particular investment method 
makes the hotel business a capital-intensive industry similar to manufacturing industries 
(Houthakker, 1979; Tsai & Gu, 2012). The majority of the hotel investment consists of 
properties, which depreciate in value by time and require maintenance, refurbishment, 
and renewal. Hence, these investments require periodic capital expenditures to maintain 
the service quality. However, it may be difficult for a firm to simultaneously 
operationalize these investments at national and/or global level and to reach economies of 
scale. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will bypass all projects that require 
financing beyond internal resources because raising external finance will make the 
projects unprofitable. Therefore, firms will rely on internal funds (i.e., cash and cash 
flow) to undertake capital investments and hence they may face underinvestment 
problems.  
		8 
 Contrary to the financial constraint theoretical framework, investment-cash flow 
sensitivity could be due to managerial overinvestment of free cash flow (i.e., resources at 
managers’ discretion) (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). On one hand, investment-internal 
funds sensitivity might be an indication of financial constraints and hence it suggests 
underinvestment problem (Fazzari et al., 1988). On the other hand, the relationship 
between internal funds and investments could also be due to exposure to empire building 
and hence it suggests overinvestment problem (Stein, 2003). According to Jensen (1986), 
managers of firms with free cash flow may invest beyond the optimal investment level by 
undertaking value-decreasing projects to build empires. While the availability of internal 
funds may reduce underinvestment problems described in Myers and Majluf (1984), it 
may intensify overinvestment problems described in Jensen (1986). Although investors 
and the capital market may enact internal and external governance mechanisms to control 
managerial desire to build empires, there are strategies in which managers can protect 
their positions against the disciplinary role of capital market. Market for corporate control 
is one of the external governance mechanisms that disciplines managers of firms through 
takeover threat (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). However, antitakeover provisions (or ATPs, 
lawful rules that protect corporations against takeovers) reduce the probability of 
takeover; hence, they protect managers from being replaced. Additionally, the existence 
of major shareholders provide an internal governance mechanism to control managers’ 
actions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Much of the existing research tested these theories on 
overall stock markets including all industries1. Although the results of existing research 
could be generalizable across all industries, it may not well capture industry idiosyncratic 
																																								 																				
1	Most of these studies excluded regulated industries such as financial firms.		
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characteristics such as the hotel industry. Furthermore, it is a stylized fact that franchising 
is the most commonly adopted business investment model in the hotel industry. To void 
this gap in the literature, this dissertation therefore examines the effects underinvestment 
and overinvestment and the organizational forms of franchising and REIT on hotels’ firm 
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity, and the value of cash holdings.  
 While sensitivity of capital investment to internal funds is well documented, little 
is known the extent to which this relationship is due to financial constraint or empire 
building (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Stein, 2003). Thus, while firms may adopt 
franchising due to financial constraints, they may also be exposed to empire building if 
managers seek private benefits. In other words, although the informational asymmetries 
and the capital scarcity theory of franchising suggest that firms adopt franchising as a 
solution to reduce underinvestment problem, there are at least two ways, in which 
franchising firms may overinvest. First, most hotel firms undertake investments that 
require substantial capital spending (e.g. company-owned hotel investments and 
acquisitions) in addition to franchising investments. Jensen (1986) argues that managers 
of firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing powers are more likely to complete 
negative NPV projects. Thus, an investment that requires substantial capital spending like 
the development or the acquisition of a hotel could be an overinvestment. Accordingly, 
managers of firms with desires to build empires may undertake investments that benefit 
them but not necessarily the shareholders. Hence, hotel firms that adopt the franchising 
investment business model might also face overinvestment problems. Second, in a model 
where market share is considered as an investment, Chevalier (1995) showed that 
managers with a desire to build empires could overinvest in the market share. While 
		10 
increasing the market share increases the sales and ultimately benefits the managers, it 
may not benefit the shareholders. Thus, firms that adopt the franchising business 
investment model might be overinvesting in the market share by increasing the number of 
franchise units in the system. In summary, both underinvestment and overinvestment 
problems distort firm value. While the franchising business investment model might be a 
solution to reduce underinvestment problem, firms that adopt franchising might 
overinvest if managers have a desire to build empires. Accordingly, the following 
propositions are offered for testing purposes: 
Proposition 4: there is a relationship between investments and firms’ value.  
Proposition 5: there is a relationship between firm value and cash holdings. 
Proposition 6: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms 
moderate the relationship between investments and firms’ value. 
Proposition 7: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms 
moderate the relationship between investments and internal funds. 
Proposition 8: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms 
moderate the relationship between firm value and cash holdings. 
 Furthermore, the hotel industry consists of real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
and C-corporation structures. The major difference between Hotel REITs and traditional 
corporations is that shareholders of Hotel REITs are exempt from corporate taxation on 
distributed dividends. However, to qualify as a REIT, the firm has to meet the criteria 
required by the Internal Revenue Code related to asset ownership, income generation, and 
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most importantly dividend payouts (Gu & Kim, 2003). That is, REITs must distribute 
90% of their taxable income to shareholders every year, which leave them with little 
internal funds available to undertake investments, and hence they must seek external 
funds for expansion (Beals & Arabia, 1998). Consequently, while the REIT could be 
useful to mitigate overinvestment problems, Hotel REITs may face severe 
underinvestment problems given that they are required to distribute most of their income. 
However, this is ultimately an empirical question. Therefore, I offer the following 
propositions to be tested:  
Proposition 9: underinvestment problems are higher within the REIT 
organizational form relative to C-corporations.    
Proposition 10: overinvestment problems are lower within the REIT 
organizational form relative to C-corporations.  
 This dissertation research is based on the underinvestment theory (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984) and overinvestment (Jensen, 1986) theory suggesting that financial 
condition of the firms influence the investment decisions and the capital scarcity 
(Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969) and agency (Rubin, 1978) theories of franchising 
suggesting that monitoring cost and lack of financial resources lead hotel firms to 
undertake franchising organizational form. The two central hypotheses of the proposed 
dissertation research are 1) both underinvestment and overinvestment deteriorate firms’ 
value; 2) both capital scarcity and monitoring cost lead firms to undertake franchising as 
their investment model. While there is extensive empirical evidence showing that 
investment decisions depend on the financial condition of the firm under imperfect 
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capital market conditions, the extent to which the relationship is due to the degree of 
financial constraints or empire building is not well explained (Stein, 2003). Furthermore, 
empirical studies that examine the capital scarcity and agency theories of franchising lack 
serious methodological problems regarding the identification of capital scarcity of the 
firms and monitoring cost proxies. Therefore, identification of the effects of the financial 
constraint and exposure to empire building levels can contribute to solve the extent to 
which the relationships between investment and firm value and investment and internal 
funds are due to underinvestment and overinvestment problems, explain why firms adapt 
franchising investment business model, and show the efficacy of Hotel-REITs and 
franchising organizational forms on mitigating underinvestment and overinvestment 
problems.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is threefold: (1) to investigate the extent to which 
investments affect hotel firms’ value by examining the effects of financial constraints, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and organizational forms of franchising and REIT on 
acquisitions; (2) to examine the sensitivity of capital and franchising investments to 
internal funds; (3) to examine the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and 
corporate governance affect the marginal value of cash in hotel firms. 
 More specifically, first, the effects of financial constraints and corporate 
governance mechanisms on hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with 
acquisitions are examined to determine the extent to which investments create value in 
some firms and reduce value in others. Second, the abnormal returns associated with 
franchising hotel firms’ acquisition announcements are analyzed to determine the extent 
to which franchising is due to financial constraints, agency cost, or weak corporate 
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governance. Third, abnormal returns associated with hotel-REITs’ acquisition 
announcements are investigated to identify whether the REIT is due to financial 
constraints, agency cost, or poor corporate governance. Fourth, the relation between 
internal funds and hotel firms’ investments are analyzed by classifying firms into 
constrained and unconstrained portfolios using financial constraints indices, and 
dictatorship and democracy portfolios using corporate governance indices. Also, the 
effects of franchising experience and internal funds on the proportion of franchised 
divisions are examined to determine why firms adopt franchising investment. 
Furthermore, the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is investigated 
in order to determine the marginal value of cash holdings in hotel firms. Moreover, the 
effects of financial constraints and corporate governance on the relation between 
marginal cash holdings and firm value are examined in order to determine the extent to 
which asymmetric information or agency problems are more costly for firms. Lastly, the 
effect of franchising on the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is 
analyzed in order to determine why firms adopt franchising investment. 
 Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to answer the following research questions.  
1) How is firm value affected along the dimensions of financial constraint and 
exposure to empire building?  
2) Does the REIT organizational form solve the overinvestment problem? Or, does it 
increase the underinvestment problem?  
3) To what extent financial constraint and exposure to empire building affect 
investment-cash flow sensitivity?  
4) Why do firms adopt the franchising business investment model? 
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5) How is firm value affected along the two lines of franchise and company-owned 
unit investments? 
 The results show that financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly 
positive returns, while firms with weak corporate governance experience negative gains 
around the acquisition announcements. Acquisitions are positively received when they 
indicate underinvestment problems, while they are negatively viewed when they are an 
indication of overinvestment problem. The joint effects of financial constraints and 
corporate governance show that financial constraints have more effect on firm value than 
corporate governance. However, most of the firms seem to have weak corporate 
governance mechanisms, suggesting that hotel firms are more exposed to empire building 
than financial constraints. Although the majority of the hotel firms have weak corporate 
governance mechanism, the investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially 
constrained firms than for dictatorship firms. In other words, financially constrained 
firms rely more on internal funds than do dictatorship firms, which indicates that the 
relationship between internal funds and investment is mostly due to financial constraints. 
Similarly, the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained hotel firms 
than for unconstrained hotel firms, while it is lower for poorly-governed firms than for 
well-governed firms. The coefficient of marginal cash is greater for financially 
constrained firms than for poorly-governed firms, suggesting that the asymmetric 
information problem is more costly than agency problems. The hotel-REITs and 
franchising firms experience negative returns, suggesting that these firms are more likely 
to make poorer acquisitions relative to C-corporation counterparts. The results from the 
examination of the marginal value of cash holdings in firms that expand through 
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franchising indicates that franchising could be utilized as a solution for underinvestment 
and agency problems; however, it seems to magnify overinvestment problems in poorly-
governed firms.   
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
first essay titled “The effects of financial constraints and corporate governance on hotel 
firms’ value”. Section 3 presents the second essay titled “The sensitivity of hotel firms’ 
investment to internal funds: The role of financial constraints and agency problems”. 
Section 4 presents the third essay titled “The value of cash holdings in hotel firms: The 
role of franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance”. Section 5 
concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON 
HOTEL FIRMS’ VALUE 
2.1 Introduction 
  Corporations undertake investments in a variety of forms to expand their business 
and create value for stockholders. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which generally 
require substantial capital investments, are common investment methods in publicly 
traded hotel firms (Canina et al., 2010). M&A allow hotel firms to expand rapidly in both 
domestic and foreign markets and the acquisition strategy eliminates the excessive time 
for launching a new hotel property from the beginning.  
 However, an acquisition could be a value-increasing or decreasing project for a 
firm. On the one hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there is a wedge between the 
cost of internal and external funds due to asymmetric information problems, and firms 
with growth opportunities might abandon value-increasing projects, which can lead to 
underinvestment problems. These firms are considered financially constrained and are 
expected to undertake value-increasing investments to reach optimal investment level, 
wherein the firm value is maximized. Therefore, financially constrained firms may 
expand through M&A to overcome the asymmetric information problems that are 
prevalent in capital markets (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2014). Consequently, 
shareholders would react positively to the news of a major hotel acquisition. 
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 The purpose of this study is to examine shareholders’ reactions to news of 
acquisitions in the hotel industry. If many hotel firms are financially constrained, then 
such news would be positively received. On the other hand, Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
show that M&A announcements have on average neutral effects on acquiring firms' 
returns. Given that managers often pursue M&A deals despite the lack of obvious value 
creation, they conclude that CEOs frequently build empires “by increasing the scope of 
firm well beyond a level that maximizes shareholder wealth” (Avery, Chevalier, & 
Schaefer, 1998, p. 24). Indeed such M&A strategies may benefit managers more than 
they do the shareholders who own the firm. Many external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms have been instituted to prevent management from undertaking 
value-decreasing projects (see Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005; 
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). For example, the quality of 
internal governance can be increased by a larger fraction of shareholders that are 
institutional investors, and the quality of external governances can be improved with 
fewer antitakeover provisions (ATPs). This study analyzes stock market reactions to 
announcements of acquisitions by hotel firms to determine if overinvestment is a major 
problem in this industry. 
 The organization structure of a hotel firm may affect whether hotel chains are 
financially constrained or have governance problems. Many firms in the hotel industry 
expand via acquisitions using franchising investment. In this model, franchisors shift the 
capital investment risk to the franchisees in exchange for their expertise and brand name. 
Alon et al. (2012) show that this strategy works especially well in global hotel 
expansions. Unlike other industries, such as manufacturing, service, which is intangible 
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and perishable, is the main product in the hotel industry; yet it requires substantial capital 
investments to deliver the service. Also, hotel investments depreciate rapidly and often 
require expensive refurbishment. Therefore, in addition to difficulties of financing hotel 
properties and excessive time required to meet local standards and approvals, such as 
zoning, land use, and site development, hotel investments demand periodic capital 
expenditures to sustain the service quality. Moreover, strong competition in the global 
hotel industry requires an ongoing investment in innovative and advanced technologies to 
meet ever-higher quality from hotel guests. These attributes of the hotel industry make 
hotel business a capital-intensive industry. Therefore, franchising could be an efficient 
investment model for financially constrained hotel firms to meet the increased demands 
of their industry (Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969) 
 Although franchising investments require little or no capital expenditures and they 
enable firms to expand rapidly, franchising could make overinvestment easier for empire-
building CEOs. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with free cash flow tend to 
show inept or wasteful investment behavior by overinvesting in rather value-decreasing 
projects. In the case of franchising firms, managers might have too much access to 
financing, which is generated through franchising and royalty fees, and hence they can 
make poor investment choices in acquisitions. Therefore, franchising might be a useful 
corporate strategy to control the managerial desire to build empires, if firm is solely 
expand through franchising because a new franchised division will not require substantial 
capital investment. However, empire-building CEOs of firms that expand through mixed 
method (i.e., franchising and capital investments) might intensify overinvestment 
problems.  
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 Another type of organizational structure that could affect financial constraints or 
governance problems in the hotel industry is the real estate investment trust (REIT). 
Hotel firms might have high cash flows, which could create agency problems if the 
managers’ interests are not aligned with those of shareholders. Unlike the C-corporation 
structure, hotel-REITs must distribute 90% of their earnings to the shareholders. Hence, 
firms with agency problems may adopt the REIT organizational form to legally force 
managers to distribute most of firms’ income to shareholders. However, a hotel-REIT 
might be constrained from making positive NPV investments because they will be 
remained with only 10% of their income. Therefore, while the REIT could be useful to 
mitigate overinvestment problems, hotel-REITs may face severe underinvestment 
problems given that they are required to distribute most of their income. Nonetheless, this 
is ultimately an empirical question, in which the hotel industry provides a unique setting 
that allows examination of the effects of under- and overinvestment problems on the firm 
value.  
 Using a sample of acquisitions in the hotel industry, this study investigates the 
extent to which investments create value in some firms and reduce value in others by 
examining the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, and 
organizational forms of franchising and REIT on hotel firms’ value. More specifically, 
the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, franchising, and 
REIT on hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition 
announcements are examined.  
 The results show that financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly 
positive returns, while firms with weak corporate governance experience negative gains 
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around the acquisition announcements. Acquisitions are positively received when they 
indicate underinvestment problems, while they are negatively viewed when they are an 
indication of overinvestment problem. The joint effects of financial constraints and 
corporate governance show that financial constraints have more effect on firm value than 
corporate governance. However, most of the firms seem to have weak corporate 
governance mechanisms. The hotel-REITs and franchising firms experience negative 
returns, suggesting that these firms are more likely to make poorer acquisitions relative to 
C-corporation counterparts.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the study hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical approach 
of this study. Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the effects of financial 
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms on hotel firms’ value. Section 5 
concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there are informational asymmetries between 
firms and outside investors and thus raising capital to undertake investments beyond the 
internal funds could be costly. Therefore, firms will bypass the value-increasing project if 
internal funds are not sufficient to undertake a positive net present value (NPV) project 
because raising external funds increases the project’s cost to a level that makes the 
positive NPV project negative (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, firms that face 
underinvestment problems due to asymmetric information are considered financially 
constrained (Fazzari et al., 1988). In general, financially constrained firms are small and 
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young and have greater investment opportunities. Almeida et al. (2004) find that 
financially constrained firms keep higher amount of cash to undertake value-increasing 
projects because the opportunity cost of internal finance is lower than the opportunity 
cost of external finance. Therefore, financially constrained firms are expected to use the 
resources to undertake value-increasing projects to reach the optimal investment level 
and to maximize the firm value. A marginal investment is expected to create more value 
in financially constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009). 
Alshwer, Sibilkov, and Zaitats (2011) showed that financially constrained firms are more 
likely to use stocks in acquisitions and keep the cash for different investments suggesting 
that constrained firms alleviate the asymmetric information faced in capital markets when 
acquiring a firm. In other words, constrained firms reduce the wedge between external 
and internal finance in acquisitions because informational asymmetries between the 
acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in relation to the capital markets. 
Recently however Khatami et al. (2014) show that financially constrained firms gain 
more from the acquisitions relative to unconstrained firms regardless of the method of 
payment suggesting that constrained firms make better investment decisions because they 
have limited funds but higher unexploited investment opportunities. Overall, financially 
constrained firms are expected to have positive returns from the acquisitions regardless of 
the method of payment because they may successfully manage to exercise investment 
opportunities either by internally generating the cash necessary or using stocks, where 
they are able to reduce asymmetric information problem faced in capital markets, to 
undertake the investment. The following hypotheses are driven based on the 
underinvestment theory: 
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H1a: There is a positive relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are 
associated with acquisition announcements and financial constraint indices, as financial 
constraints increase so does the hotel firms’ abnormal returns. 
H1b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher 
for financially constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms.  
 Instead of bypassing the positive NPV projects due to financial constraints, the 
capital scarcity theory of franchising posits that firms adopt franchising as an alternative 
to the company-owned investment (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969). That is, firms with 
growth prospects expand through franchising in order to fund the growth because they do 
not need to allocate substantial capital for expansion through franchising. Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly (1968-1969) argue that firms will expand through franchising when they lack 
internal resources and ultimately will buy back franchisees and become wholly owned 
chains when they mature. Hunt (1973) provides empirical evidence showing that with 
increased size and age firms tend to buy back franchised units. Similarly, Caves and 
Murphy (1976) show that franchising firms are inclined to grow through wholly owned 
hotel establishments with maturity rather than franchising. Hunt (1973) argues that 
franchising is very similar to raising stock for expansion in which franchisees are the 
source of financial resources rather than stockholders. While studies that empirically 
examine the capital scarcity theory assume that all firms that adopt franchising are 
financially constrained (see e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & David J., 1999), the 
degree of financial constraints may vary significantly across firms (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
Thus, the franchising investment model could be a solution to reduce underinvestment 
problems for financially constrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems 
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(Myers & Majluf, 1984; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969). Accordingly, both 
underinvestment and capital scarcity theories predict the following hypothesis:  
H2a: There is a positive relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are 
associated with acquisition announcements and franchising. 
H2b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher 
for financially constrained franchising firms than for unconstrained franchising firms. 
 Conversely, Rubin (1978) suggests that capital scarcity theory cannot be a good 
explanation of franchising. He argues that raising external finance through traditional 
channels, such as debt and equity markets, is less costly than franchising because 
franchisees will have undiversified investments and hence they will require higher 
expected return. He instead posits that firms adopt franchising to overcome the agency 
conflicts between divisional managers and the central company in which divisional 
managers might shirk from their responsibilities. However, the agency theory predicts 
that franchised divisions are not free of agency costs and thus a conflict of interest may 
arise between franchised divisions and the firm (Brickley et al., 1991). In general, this 
conflict of interest arises from two sources: (1) franchisees’ incentives to free ride on the 
trademark by providing low quality service to non-repeat customers and (2) disparities 
between divisional managers and the firm related to managerial shirking and 
consumption of perquisites (Brickley & Dark, 1987). Although firms can monitor the 
divisional managers’ performances, the monitoring cost may be so high that it is 
unprofitable. Typically, the cost of monitoring divisional managers is higher than the cost 
of franchisees’ free-riding on the trademark when the hotel property is located remotely 
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from headquarters of the franchising firms. Therefore, firms will prefer franchising over 
company owned divisions when the expansion of the hotel network will take place in 
geographic areas that are located far from headquarters (Brickley & Dark, 1987). 
However, empirical evidence is mixed with some studies finding support in favor of the 
agency theory of franchising (see e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Brickley et al., 1991; 
Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Roh & Kwag, 1997), while other studies show that both capital 
scarcity and agency costs lead firms to adopt franchising (see e.g., Combs & David J., 
1999; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). The agency theory of franchising postulates that 
the cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that require high levels of investments, 
and hence firms will own the division that requires high levels of investment rather than 
franchising it (Brickley et al., 1991). This suggests the following hypotheses: 
H3a: There is a positive relationship between the relative deal size and franchising hotel 
firms’ abnormal returns, as the relative deal size increases so does the franchising hotel 
firms’ abnormal returns. 
H3b: The franchising hotel firms’ mean abnormal returns that are associated with 
acquisition announcements are significantly different from zero. 
 Franchising may help solve these agency problems, but in the context of hotel 
expansion it may exacerbate another. In particular, Jensen (1986) argues that managers of 
firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing power are more likely to build empires 
by undertaking projects that benefit them but not necessarily the shareholders. Managers 
tend to waste the free cash flow by investing in value-decreasing projects, instead of 
distributing it to the shareholders, which creates overinvestment problems. Therefore, 
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Jensen (1986) suggests that firms should distribute the free cash flow to shareholders and 
fund the projects by raising external funds to eliminate overinvestment problems. An 
extensive body of empirical literature provides evidence supporting the argument made 
by Jensen (1986) that empire building firms experience negative returns from 
acquisitions (Chen & Ho, 1997; Doukas, 1995; Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991). A hotel 
investment that requires substantial capital spending could be an overinvestment and 
franchising could make these easier for empire-building CEOs.  
While early studies used investment opportunities that are measured by Tobin’s Q 
(see e.g., Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1989) and the amount of free cash flow (see e.g., 
Doukas, 1995; Lang et al., 1991) to identify empire building firms, recent studies utilize 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze 
the effects of the external governance mechanism on the firm value using an external 
governance index that consists of 24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more 
ATPs make poorer investments. Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role 
of market for corporate control and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn, 
make it difficult to replace the manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost 
between managers and shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires. 
Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2006) examine the effects of the external governance 
mechanism on the value of firms using an alternative index that only consists of six of the 
24 ATPs used by Gompers et al. (2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious 
index negatively affects the firm value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm 
value. The six ATPs are presence of staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw 
amendments, limit to shareholders charter amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority 
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requirement to approve a merger, and poison pills. Along the same line, Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of staggered board effect on the value of the firm 
and find that firms with staggered board of directors have significantly lower firm value. 
Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the existence of large investors 
increases the quality of internal governance. Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) and 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism 
using the percentage shareholding by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on 
the firm value and find that firm value increases with increased amount of institutional 
investors. More recently, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show that firms with more 
ATPs and/or lower amount of institutional investors make poorer acquisitions suggesting 
that poor internal and external governance mechanisms negatively affect firms’ value. 
Therefore, managers of firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms are more 
likely to make poorer acquisitions and move beyond the optimal investment level relative 
to managers of firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms. Accordingly, 
overinvestment theory predicts the following hypothesis:   
H4a: There is a negative relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are 
associated with acquisition announcements and corporate governance indices. 
H4b: Firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are 
lower for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms. 
 In addition to corporate governance mechanisms, franchising investment model 
might be utilized as a control mechanism to prevent managerial overinvestment of free 
cash flows, as franchisor firms allocates little or no capital expenditure for expanding 
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through franchising. In other words, franchising could be a way of dealing with 
overinvestment problem and hence it might be utilized to supplement the corporate 
governance mechanism. Accordingly, franchising firms will be less likely to make 
acquisitions because acquisitions will be viewed as overinvestments. However, managers 
of firms that adopt franchising might waste company resources by making value-
decreasing acquisitions, if their interests are not aligned with the shareholders. The 
following hypotheses are proposed for testing the above predictions:  
H5a: There is a negative relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are 
associated with acquisition announcements and franchising. 
H5b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are lower 
for poorly-governed franchising firms than for well-governed franchising firms.  
 Another organizational structure that is important for the hotel industry is that of 
the REIT. The major difference between hotel-REITs and traditional corporations is that 
shareholders of hotel-REITs are exempt from corporate taxation on distributed dividends. 
However, to qualify as a REIT, the firm has to meet the criteria required by the Internal 
Revenue Code (in the case of the US) related to asset ownership, income generation, and 
most importantly dividend payouts (Gu & Kim, 2003). That is, REITs must distribute 
90% of their taxable income to shareholders every year, which leave them with few 
internal funds available to undertake investments, and hence they must seek external 
funds for expansion (Beals & Arabia, 1998). Consequently, while the REIT 
organizational form could be useful to mitigate overinvestment problems, it could lead to 
underinvestment problems. J. Kim and Jang (2012) compare the financial constraint 
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levels of Hotel REITs and C-corporation hotels based on Tobin’s Q and show that hotel-
REITs are more constrained than C-corporation hotels. However, a number of studies 
show that measuring financial constraint levels using Tobin’s Q could be misleading 
because it is generally imprecise in capturing financial constraints well (Whited & Wu, 
2006). Therefore, it is not clear whether the REIT corporate structure mitigates 
overinvestment problems or intensifies underinvestment problems relative to C-
corporations. Analyzing whether hotel-REITs’ profitability differs from C-corporation 
hotel based on return on assets, Tang and Jang show that hotel-REITs’ and C-corporation 
hotels’ profitability do not diverge. H. Kim, Mattila, and Gu (2002) suggest that 
expansion through acquisitions may create synergy and increase hotel-REITs’ 
performances. Nonetheless, it has not been determined whether firms with different 
corporate structures perform differently in acquisitions. Therefore, based on the 
arguments in the literature regarding corporate structure differences on performance and 
under- and overinvestment problems, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H6a: There is a relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated 
with acquisition announcements and REIT. 
H6b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher 
for financially constrained REITs than for unconstrained REITs. 
H6c: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are lower for 
poorly-governed REITs than for well-governed REITs. 
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2.3 Empirical Approach 
 The observations with missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis 
and the observations with missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s 
median values. All the variables are winsorized from 1% and 99% level to remove the 
effects of outliers. One sample t-test and Wilcoxon-signed rank test are employed to 
analyze whether the CAR mean and median is significantly different from zero. 
Independent sample t-test is used to analyze the firms’ CAR mean differences between 
constrained and unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy firm portfolios. 
Multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
OLS techniques may yield spurious results if the Gauss-Markov assumptions of OLS are 
violated. Therefore, the residuals of the model must be diagnosed to determine whether 
the estimated coefficients are best linear and unbiased (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003). 
Residuals are diagnosed graphically, skewness and kurtosis values are examined, and 
Shapiro Wilk’s test of normality is conducted to test the assumptions of normal 
distribution of residuals. Diagnostics revealed that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Bootstrapping technique is used to produce standard errors and probability 
values based on normally distributed data. The reported standard errors and probability 
values are based on the bootstrapping sample analysis. The residuals are diagnosed for 
the presence of heteroscedasticity using White (1980) test. Most of the models’ residuals 
appear to suffer from heteroscedasticity problem and hence MacKinnon and White 
(1985) adjustment method is used to obtain robust standard errors. The residuals are 
further diagnosed to test the presence of autocorrelation utilizing Wooldridge (2002) test. 
The data is clustered based on the firms to deal with the autocorrelation and provide 
		30 
robust standard errors. Variance Inflation factors are examined for multicollinearity and 
all the values in all the models yield acceptable results. Accordingly, the estimated 
parameters of the model are BLUE and hence reliable. 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 The data on acquisition announcements are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Database for the period of 1990-2013. 
Initially, 633 announcements are identified that include both hotel-REITs and C-
corporation hotels. However, the following criteria are required for the transactions to be 
included in the sample of the study: 
1) The acquisition is completed.  
2) The deal value is $1 million or higher.  
3) The acquiring firm must have financial statement information available from the 
Compustat database and company filings from the US Securities and Exchange 
Commissions (SEC) EDGAR on the year of the announcement date and stock 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) on the month 
of the announcement date.  
4) Acquiring firms are US companies that are traded on NYSE, NASDAQ or 
AMEX.  
 The announcements where the acquiring firms have more than one acquisition 
within three days of the announcements are excluded. The announcement data from the 
SDC Platinum Database are matched with the stock return data from CRSP, financial 
statement data from the Compustat, and the corporate governance data from the SEC 
		31 
EDGAR. The final sample consists of 178 observations with 21 unique firms over the 
period of 1995-2013. The bootstrap method is used to produce standard errors and 
probability values based on larger bootstrap samples to deal with problems associated 
with small sample size.  
2.3.2 Model Specification 
 The dependent variable is the acquiring firm’s cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). The independent variables are the organizational forms and financial constraint 
and corporate governance indices. Deal and acquiring firm characteristics are used as 
control variables. 
 The dependent variable CAR is measured around the acquisition announcement 
dates using standard event study methodology following Brown and Warner (1985). The 
announcement dates are obtained from SDC. Daily stock returns, expected returns, and 
CAR are analyzed. Daily stock returns are calculated for the 3-day event period (-1, 1) 
around the announcement dates as follows.  
            𝑅!" =  !!" !!"!! − 1        (1) 
where 𝑅!" is the actual return on share i on day t, 𝑃!" is the price for share i on day t, and 𝑃!"!! is the price of share i on day t-1. To estimate the expected return, for each event, we 
employed the market model. The market model is a simple OLS regression model. The 
parameters are estimated via OLS regression using 200 (-11 to -210) trading day daily 
returns prior to the event windows; note that the sample size is 200 for each event. The 
model specified as follows. 
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 𝐸(𝑅!") =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝑅!" +  𝑒!"         (2) 
where 𝐸(𝑅!") is the expected return on share i on day t, 𝑅!" is the market return, which is 
the value-weighted return, on day t, 𝑒!" is the random disturbance term, and 𝑎! and 𝛽! are 
the market model parameters. For each day of the event window, the abnormal returns are 
computed as the difference between actual return and the expected return, which is the 
estimated return in the absence of the event, using the following equation: 
 𝐴𝑅!" =  𝑅!" −  𝐸(𝑅!")               (3) 
where 𝐴𝑅!" is the abnormal return on share i on day t. The dependent variable CAR is 
constructed as 3 (-1, 1) day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date, 
where zero is the event day, of the acquisitions.  
 The data for constructing the financial constraint indices is obtained from the 
Compustat database based on the firms’ financial statements. The Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) (KZ), the Whited and Wu (2006), and the Size and Age (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010) 
financial constraint indices are used as measures of financial constraints. The, KZ, WW, 
and SA financial constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in 
Lamont et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), 
respectively as follows.  
𝐾𝑍 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 –  39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 –  1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 + 
3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷          (4) 
𝑊𝑊 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  0.93– 0.09×𝐶𝐹 –  0.06×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑂𝑆 +  0.02×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 –  0.04×𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 +0.1×𝐼𝑆𝐺 –  0.035×𝑆𝐺         (5) 
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𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.043×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!– 0.040×𝐴𝑔𝑒    (6) 
where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus 
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total 
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and short-
term investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q equals to 
total assets (item 6) plus CRSP December Market Equity, which is measured by the 
firm’s December closing price on CRSP (item 199) times common shares outstanding 
(item 25), minus common equity (item 60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74) 
divided by total assets (item 6); DIVPOS is an indicator that is equal to one if the firm 
pays dividends and zero otherwise; TLTD is the total long term debt (item 9) divided by 
total assets (item 6); LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; ISG is the sample 
firms’ average sales growth; SG is the firm’s real sales growth; Size is natural logarithm 
of total assets; and Age is the number of years the firm has been on Compustat with a 
non-missing financial data information. Items are Compustat annual items and they are 
lagged 1 year with the exception of item 6, which is lagged 2 years (the constant term, 
0.938, in the WW index is obtained from Franzoni (2009)). 
 A higher score of the indices indicates more financial constraints and hence 
higher underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two portfolios as constrained 
(above median) and unconstrained (below median) based on KZ, WW, and SA financial 
constraint index values.   
 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes 24 ATPs, which 
decrease the ability of the investors to replace the manager, for about 2,000 large 
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corporations. However, the publications do not comprise the firms in this study sample. 
Therefore, the data is hand-collected from firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and 10-
K statements, certificate of incorporation, and shareholders’ rights plan on the SEC 
EDGAR. The external governance index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is 
constructed following the criteria used in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are 
the presence of staggered board, limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on 
amending the charter, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes, 
and poison pill. Basically, the BCF index is the total number of ATPs of firms that takes 
the value from one to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and 
hence higher overinvestment problems. Additionally, following Bebchuk et al. (2006), 
dictatorship and democracy portfolios are created based on the firms’ number of ATPs, in 
which firms with three or more ATPs are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while 
firms with two or less ATPs are included in the democracy portfolio. Also, following 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) the presence of staggered board is used as an alternative 
governance measure, where the presence of staggered board indicates poor governance. 
 As a measure of internal governance mechanism, institutional block holdings is 
utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The 
block holdings index is constructed as the sum of percentage of shares held by the firm’s 
institutional investors that are greater than 5% ownership of the firm’s outstanding 
shares. To construct this measure, the data on institutional share holdings is obtained 
from the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, which collects 
information on institutional shareholdings from the SEC 13-F filings.  
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 Furthermore, two dummy variables are created to capture the effects of 
organizational forms, which are denoted as “franchising”, where firms that adopt the 
franchising take the value of one and zero otherwise, and “REIT”, where firms that are 
registered as REITs take the value of one and zero otherwise. Also, four interaction 
variables that are termed “constrained franchising”, “poorly-governed franchising”, 
“constrained REIT”, and “poorly-governed REIT” to measure the differences between 
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms, and constrained and unconstrained 
REIT firms, poorly-governed and well-governed franchising firms, and poorly-governed 
and well-governed REIT firms.  
 A strand of literature has documented that acquisitions could be either value-
creating or decreasing events for the shareholders of acquirer firms depending on the 
acquiring firm’s and target firm’s characteristics and the method of payment (see e.g., 
Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987). In general, 
acquisitions of privately held firms create value for the shareholders, while acquisitions 
of publicly traded companies do not create value (Fuller et al., 2002). Furthermore, Heron 
and Lie (2002) show that stock-financed acquisitions destroy value, whereas cash-
financed acquisitions have neutral effects on the value of the firms. Travlos (1987) 
documents that stock-financed acquisitions of publicly traded companies destroy value, 
while those of privately held companies create value. Therefore, to capture the target 
ownership status, three dummy variables are created which are termed “public”, 
“private”, and “subsidiary”, where they take the value of one if the target is public, 
private, and subsidiary firm, respectively, and zero otherwise. Two dummy variables are 
created to capture the method of payment effect that are denoted as “all cash”, where 
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acquisitions paid by cash take the value of one and zero otherwise, and “combo”, where 
acquisitions paid by stocks or a combination of cash and stocks take the value of one and 
zero otherwise. The deal characteristics are used as additional control variables. 
Specifically, relative deal size, which is the natural log of target size divided by the 
acquirer’s market value (item 199 times item 25), method of payment, and target 
characteristics are used to control for the deal characteristics. Roll (1986) argues that 
larger firms are more likely to make poorer acquisitions and destroy value of the firm. 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find evidence supporting this argument by 
showing that large firms experience negative returns from acquisitions. Analyzing the 
effects of Tobin’s Q on acquisition returns, Lang et al. (1991) show that Tobin’s Q have a 
positive effect on the firm value. Jensen (1986) posits that free cash flow and leverage 
indicate the firm’s exposure to empire building suggesting that managers of firms with 
high free cash flow and low leverage are likely to destroy shareholders’ wealth in 
acquisitions. Following the literature, total assets (item 6), Tobin’s Q, free cash flow (the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation [item 13] minus interest expense [item 15] 
minus total income taxes [item 16] minus capital expenditures [item 128] to total assets), 
and leverage (the ratio of total debt [item 9 + item 34] to total assets [item 6]) are used to 
control for acquiring firm characteristics.  
 The following models are used to estimate the effects of corporate governance, 
financial constraints, franchising, and hotel-REIT on the acquiring firms’ returns utilizing 
panel OLS regression analysis.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"      (7)  𝐶𝐴𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼!"𝐹 + 𝐹 + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"    (8) 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼!"𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 + 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"   (9) 
where CAR is the acquiring firm i’s cumulative abnormal return at time t, I is either the 
corporate governance index of the firm i at time t or financial constraint index, F is the 
franchising and REIT is the hotel-REIT dummy variables, X represent a set of control 
variables of the firm i at time t that includes the acquiring firm’s total assets, Tobin’s Q, 
free cash flow, leverage, and relative deal size and all cash, private, and subsidiary 
dummy variables. 𝑒 is the error term and 𝑎!, 𝛽!, and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters. 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total Assets  7.48 7.42 1.28 
Free Cash Flow -0.06 -0.01 0.14 
Tobin’s Q 4.14 2.22 6.47 
Leverage 0.53 0.50 0.19 
Relative Deal Size 0.15 0.03 0.31 
KZ Index 1.87 1.31 7.69 
WW Index 0.63 0.62 0.09 
SA Index -3.45 -3.39 0.38 
BCF Index 4.19 4 1.54 
Staggered Board 0.72 1 0.44 
Block Holdings 0.06 0 0.10 
Franchising 0.32 0 0.46 
REITS 0.54 1 0.49 
	
 The summary statistics of the independent and control variables are presented in 
Table 2.1. Three different financial constraints and corporate governance indices are used 
in order to conduct the analyses based on alternative measurements of financial 
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms. 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
 This section presents the determinants of acquirer returns. Firms are grouped as 
financially constrained and unconstrained and poorly- and well-governed based on the 
financial constraints and corporate governance indices. The relationships between 
acquirer returns and the financial constraint and governance mechanism are estimated 
utilizing the OLS regression analysis to determine the effects of financial constraint and 
corporate governance mechanism on hotel firms’ returns.  
Table 2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquiring Hotel Firms	
 
Whole 
Sample 
Franchising 
Firms 
Non-Franchising 
Firms 
Hotel- 
REITs 
C-Corporation 
Hotels 
CAR Mean 0.008b 0.001 0.008c 0.001 0.016b 
 Median 0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 
Average 
change in 
Dollar Value 
(Mil.) 
10.58 34.79 -0.82 -9.92 35.15 
 Number of 
obs. 
178 57 121 97 81 
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance (α) levels, respectively based on two tailed 
tests.  
 
 Table 2.2 displays the CAR of the whole, franchising, non-franchising, hotel-
REITs, and C-corporation hotel firm samples. The mean CAR is positive in all of the 
categories and the C-corporation hotels have the highest returns relative the hotel firms in 
other samples. As can be seen from the table the non-franchising hotel firms, on average, 
experience higher returns than franchising firms; and the C-corporation hotels have 
higher returns than hotel-REITs. Although the returns are only statistically significant for 
the non-franchising and C-corporation hotel groups, the dollar value of the returns 
underline the economic significance of the losses.  Therefore, these preliminarily 
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analyses indicate that managers of franchising and hotel-REITs firms make relatively 
poorer acquisitions.  
Table 2.3 The CAR Mean Differences 
Financial Constraint 
Criteria 
Constrained 
(Con) 
Unconstrained 
(Un) t-value 
Dollar Value (mil.)  
Con Un 
KZ Index 0.012 -0.002 -1.72c 17.70 -0.85 
WW Index 0.013 0.006 -0.78 6.38 5.78 
SA Index 0.102 0.009 0.05 5.26 -4.37 
Corporate Governance 
Criteria Democracy Dictatorship t-value 
Dollar Value (mil.) 
Democracy Dictatorship 
BCF Index 0.024 0.002 2.74a 21.71 6.70 
Block Holdings  0.012 0.004 -1.24 14.78 6.82 
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
 
 The independent sample t-test is conducted to analyze the CAR mean differences 
between constrained and unconstrained firms and between the firms in the democracy 
and dictatorship portfolios. Table 2.3 presents the results of these tests. The CAR means 
differ between constrained and unconstrained firms based on the KZ index of financial 
constraints; and between democracy and dictatorship firms based on BCF index of 
corporate governance. The differences are statistically and economically significant. 
According to the KZ index, firms in the constrained portfolio gain $17.70 million, while 
unconstrained firms lose $0.85 million around the acquisition announcements. Similarly, 
based on the BCF index, the firms in democracy portfolio gain, on average, $21.71 
million, while the firms in dictatorship portfolio gain only $6.7 million around the 
acquisition announcements. These results suggest that corporate governance and financial 
constraint levels affect value of the hotel firms and that underinvestment appears to 
destroy more value than underinvestment. Although the mean differences are not 
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statistically significant when differences are measures utilizing other financial constraints 
and corporate governance indices, they are economically significant.  
 To further investigate other possible causes of cumulative abnormal returns, 
multivariate analysis are employed. The effects of financial constraint indices on 
acquiring hotel firms’ returns are analyzed using the whole sample and the constrained 
and unconstrained portfolio of firms, where constrained portfolio includes firms with 
financial constraint index score above median score and unconstrained portfolio includes 
the firms that have financial constraint index score below median score each year. 
Table 2.4 The effects of Financial Constraints on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns	
 
Financial 
Constraint 
Indices 
1 2 3 
Whole Con Un Whole Con Un Whole Con Un 
WW Index 0.10
a 
(2.76) 
0.27a 
(4.04) 
0.09 
(1.10) 
      
KZ Index 
   
0.001 
(1.16) 
0.008c 
(1.54) 
-0.005 
(-0.49) 
   
SA Index       
0.011 
(1.22) 
0.048 
(1.23) 
0.015c 
(1.49) 
Intercept -0.05
b
 
(-2.47) 
-0.19a 
(-3.90) 
-0.043 
(-0.99) 
0.007b 
(1.97) 
0.007 
(1.09) 
0.002 
(0.83) 
0.046 
(1.44) 
0.16 
(1.28) 
0.064c 
(1.67) 
Number of 
obs. 178 89 89 
 
178 
 
89 
 
89 
 
178 
 
89 
 
89 
Number of 
Bootstrap 
obs. 
936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.18 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.02 0.002 
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b,  and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% 
statistical significance level. 
 
The results from the Table 2.4 show that only the coefficient of WW index is significant 
(0.10, p=0.01) using the whole sample and dividing the sample based on the constrained 
		41 
and unconstrained firms. The coefficients of financial constraint indices are not 
significant for unconstrained firms. 	
Table 2.5 The effects of Financial Constraints on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns: 
Constrained vs. Unconstrained	
Financial Constraint 
Indices 
1 2 3 
Con Un Con Un Con Un 
WW Index 0.27
a 
(3.33) 
-0.21 
(-1.03)     
KZ Index   
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.001 
(-0.36)   
SA Index     
0.13a 
(2.40) 
0.004 
(0.19) 
Control variables       
Acquirer Characteristics       
Total Assets (Log) 0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(-1.38) 
-0.003 
(-0.24) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.80) 
-0.01 
(-0.75) 
Free Cash Flow -0.003 
(-0.09) 
0.27 
(0.97) 
0.09 
(1.01) 
-0.012 
(-0.06) 
-0.08c 
(-1.79) 
 
0.23 
(1.31) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
(-1.35) 
0.008 
(0.55) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
 
-0..01c 
(-1.78) 
Leverage -0.009 
(-0.42) 
0.023 
(0.60) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
-0.014 
(-0.29) 
-0.07a 
(-2.65) 
 
-0.08 
(-1.38) 
Target Characteristics       
Relative Deal Size -0.006 
(-0.28) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
0.03 
(0.59) 
-0.011 
(-0.28) 
-0.01 
(-0.80) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
Cash -0.012 
(-0.94) 
0.01 
(1.57) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.014 
(-0.95) 
0.01 
(1.08) 
Private 0.027 
(0.81) 
-0.09 
(-1.51) 
-0.016 
(-0.28) 
0.012 
(0.26) 
0.07c 
(1.90) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.93) 
Subsidiary 0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.08 
(-1.29) 
-0.014 
(-0.24) 
0.02 
(0.41) 
0.06c 
(1.65) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.91) 
Intercept -0.20a 
(-2.70) 
0.39 
(1.52) 
0.07 
(0.67) 
-0.04 
(-0.44) 
0.40b 
(2.36) 
 
0.23a 
(2.38) 
Number of obs. 89 89 89 89 89 
 
89 
Number of Bootstrap obs. 936 917 599 654 916 935 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.15 0.22 -0.02 0.21 0.11 
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b,  and c indicate 1, 5, and 
10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. 
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 However, conducting the analysis without classifying firms as financially 
constrained and unconstrained might be less than perfect. Therefore, following the 
methodologies in the previous literature (see e.g., Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), the samples 
are sorted into portfolios of constrained and unconstrained firms to better capture the 
financial constraint effect on the firm value.  
Table 2.6 The effects of Corporate Governance on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns	
Corporate 
Governance 
Indices 
1 2 3 4 
BCF Index -0.008b  
(-1.73)    
Staggered 
Board  
-0.008  
(-0.63)   
Block Holdings 
  
0.001  
(0.03)  
Dictatorship 
   
-0.035b  
(-2.22) 
Control variables 
Acquirer Characteristics 
Total Assets 
(Log) 
0.002  
(0.48) 
-0.003  
(-0.97) 
-0.002  
(-0.67) 
0.001  
(0.22) 
Free Cash Flow 0.033  
(0.63) 
-0.007  
(-0.16) 
-0.003  
(-0.09) 
0.48  
(0.92) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001  
(0.16) 
0.001  
(0.12) 
0.001  
(0.77) 
0.001  
(0.07) 
Leverage -0.002  
(-0.10) 
-0.022  
(-0.98) 
-0.018  
(-0.98) 
-0.017  
(-0.75) 
Deal Characteristics 
Relative Deal 
Size 
-0.012  
(-0.53) 
-0.013  
(-0.55) 
-0.001  
(-0.01) 
-0.017  
(-0.81) 
Cash 0.08  
(0.88) 
0.004  
(0.49) 
0.003  
(0.41) 
0.017  
(1.47) 
Private 0.001  
(0.03) 
0.001  
(0.02) 
-0.004  
(-0.14) 
0.003  
(0.11) 
Subsidiary 0.04  
(0.15) 
0.004  
(0.14) 
-0.004  
(-0.14) 
0.008  
(0.30) 
Intercept 0.031  
(0.68) 
0.054  
(1.12) 
0.036  
(0.81) 
0.376  
(0.84) 
Number of obs. 178 178 178 178 
Number of 
Bootstrap obs. 936 936 936 936 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.001 -0.02 0.06 
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% 
statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-sided tests.  
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Table 2.5 reports the results of the analysis of financial constraint effects on acquiring 
firms’ returns with controlling for acquiring and deal characteristics. The coefficients of 
WW and SA indices of financial constraints are positive and significant (0.27, p=0.01 
and 0.13, p=0.01, respectively) for the constrained firms’ portfolio, while the coefficient 
of KZ index of financial constraints is not significant. These results provide support for 
the hypotheses drawn from the underinvestment theory (H1a and H1b) that financially 
constrained firms gain significantly higher returns than unconstrained firms, suggesting 
that managers of financially constrained firms make better acquisitions than those of 
unconstrained firms using their internal resources.  
  The effects of corporate governance indices on acquiring hotel firms’ returns are 
analyzed. Table 2.6 presents the OLS regression analyses of acquiring hotel firms’ 
returns based on corporate governance indices controlling for acquirer and deal 
characteristics. The results from Table 2.6 show that BCF index (continuous variable 
form) significantly and negatively affect the cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting that 
an addition of one provision decreases the CAR by 0.8%. Similarly, firms in the 
dictatorship portfolio have 2.3% lower abnormal returns than firms in the democracy 
portfolio utilizing dictatorship (dummy variable form) index of corporate governance. 
However, the coefficients of block holdings, staggered board, and the variables that 
control for the acquirer and deal characteristics are not statistically significant. Overall, 
these results provide support for the overinvestment hypotheses (H4a and H4b) that firms 
with poor governance mechanisms experience negative gains from the acquisitions 
relative to the firms with better governance mechanisms. These results indicate that 
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managers of the firms that are protected by more ATPs make poorer acquisitions in 
which managers may receive personal benefits.  
Table 2.7 The joint effects of Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance  
Financial 
Constraint 
Indices 
1 2 3 4 
WW Index 0.29a (3.02) 0.27a (2.62)   
SA Index 
  0.18b (2.28) 0.13c (1.71) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Indices     
Dictatorship -0.04a (-2.81)  -0.04
a (-3.05)  
BCF Index  -0.006 (-1.20)  -0.02
a (-2.91) 
Control variables 
Acquirer Characteristics 
Total Assets 
(Log) -0.001 (-0.12) 0.001 (0.12) 0.01 (0.65) -0.003 (-0.19) 
Free Cash 
Flow 0.033 (0.77) 0.007 (0.16) -0.04 (-0.83) -0.005 (-0.10) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 (-1.16) -0.001 (-1.01) -0.001 (-1.10) -0.001 (-0.60) 
Leverage 0.013 (0.48) 0.007 (0.25) -0.08 (-2.67) -0.06b (-1.97) 
Deal Characteristics 
Relative Deal 
Size -0.04b (-2.16) -0.031c (-1.71) -0.04c (-1.85) -0.04 (-1.95) 
Cash -0.015 (-1.35) -0.01 (-0.88) -0.03b (-2.23) -0.03b (-2.37) 
Private 0.03c (1.69) 0.017 (1.55) 0.06b (2.14) 0.04 (1.29) 
Subsidiary 0.02 (0.95) 0.004 (0.14) 0.05c (1.75) 0.03 (0.98) 
Intercept -0.19c (-1.81) -0.19c (-1.68) 0.60a (3.16) 0.53a (2.92) 
Number of 
obs. 
89 89 89 89 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.29 
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% 
statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-sided tests.  
 
 In order to determine the joint effects of under- and overinvestment problems for 
financially constrained firms, effects of financial constraints and corporate governance 
mechanisms on acquirer returns are examined. Table 2.7 presents the results of these 
analyses. The results from the Table 2.7 show that while the relationship between 
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corporate governance indices and the acquirer returns are significantly negative, there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between financial constraint indices and 
acquirer returns. 
 More specifically, one unit decrease in the quality of corporate governance 
decreases firm value by 0.2% and 0.4% based on the BCF index and dictatorship dummy 
variable, one unit increase in financial constraints increases firm value by 29% and 18% 
based on WW Index and SA Index, respectively. Although financially constrained firms 
make value-increasing acquisitions to fund their growth, poor corporate governance 
mechanisms have negative effects on returns. However, the degree of financially 
constraints has more affect on returns than weak corporate governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, these results suggest that financially constrained firms, albeit poorly-governed, 
make value-increasing investment choices. 
 Table 2.8 presents the effects of franchising and REIT organizational forms on 
acquiring hotel firms’ returns and reports the differences between constrained and 
unconstrained and between poorly- and well-governed franchising and hotel-REITs. 
Column 1 shows the returns of franchising and hotel-REITs relative to the returns of 
hotels that are registered as C-corporation that do not adopt franchising. Both the 
franchising and REIT coefficients are negative and significant, suggesting that 
organizational forms of franchising and REITs have lower returns than C-corporation 
hotels that do not franchise. The results provide support for the hypothesis (H6a) 
postulated for the REIT organizational form; however, they fail to provide support for the 
hypothesis (H2a) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of franchising.  
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Table 2.8 The effects of Franchising and REIT Forms on Acquisitions’ Returns 
Independent 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
WW Index  
 
0.21a (2.67) 
 
0.28a (3.58)   
BCF Index    -0.01c (-1.83) -0.01a (-2.85) 
Franchising -0.04
a (-3.28) 
 
0.02 (1.48) 
  -0.02 (-0.48)  
REIT -0.05
a (-3.56) 
  -0.01 (-1.06)  -0.10
b (2.57) 
Constrained 
Franchising 
(FranchisingxWW 
Index) 
 
 
 
-0.04b (-1.76)    
Poorly-Governed 
Franchising 
(FranchisingxBCF 
Index) 
   0.01 (0.16)  
Constrained REIT 
(REITxWW Index)   -0.03
b (-1.97)   
Poorly-Governed 
REIT (REITxBCF 
Index) 
 
    0.02
b (2.36) 
 
Control Variables 
Acquirer 
Characteristic      
Total Assets (Log) 0.003 (0.80) 0.003 (0.59) 0.01a (2.44) 0.001 (0.36) -0.01 (-0.25) 
Free Cash Flow -0.04 (-1.31) -0.007 (-0.16) 0.05 (1.39) 0.01 (0.28) 0.07 (1.64) 
Tobin’s Q 0.001 (0.38) -0.001 (-0.12) -0.008 (-0.91) 0.001 (0.26) 0.001 (0.26) 
Leverage -0.02 (-1.12) -0.02 (-0.75) -0.02 (-0.99) -0.002 (-0.10) -0.03 (-1.07) 
Deal Characteristic      
Relative Deal Size -0.01 (-0.93) -0.005 (-0.29) -0.02 (-1.04) -0.01 (-0.69) -0.02 (-1.15) 
Cash 0.008 (0.58) 0.02 (1.40) 0.03b (1.75) 0.005 (0.34) 0.02 (1.27) 
Private 0.01 (0.58) -0.04 (-0.24) -0.005 (-0.28) 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.01) 
Subsidiary 0.02 (0.95) -0.002 (-0.13) -0.001 (-0.01) 0.004 (0.23) 0.005 (0.33) 
Intercept 0.03 (0.84) -0.17b (-1.81) -0.24a (-2.81) 0.04 (1.00) 0.08c (1.73) 
Number of obs. 178 178 178 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% 
statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests. 
  
Column 2 measures the difference between financially constrained and unconstrained 
franchising firms. Although the coefficient of franchising variables loses significance and 
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changes sign when the interaction variable is included, the interaction term of constrained 
franchising is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05). Therefore, the hypothesis 
(H2b) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of franchising is not supported; as these 
results indicate that financially constrained franchising firms make poorer acquisitions. 
Similarly, column 3 reports the differences between financially constrained and 
unconstrained REIT firms. Although the coefficient of WW index is positive, the 
coefficients of REIT and the interaction term of constrained REIT are negative and hence 
the H6a is not supported, which imply that REIT firms make poorer acquisitions 
regardless of the degree of financial constraints. Column 4 analyzes the difference 
between poorly- and well-governed franchising firms. Although the coefficient of the 
BCF index of corporate governance is negative and statistically significant, coefficients 
of franchising and the interaction terms are not statistically significant. Column 5 
investigates the difference between poorly- and well-governed hotel-REITs. While 
coefficients of BCF index and REIT dummy variables have negative and statistically 
significant signs, the coefficient of the interaction term has a positive and statistically 
significant sign, which fails to support the hypothesis H6c. In summary, the constrained 
REIT firms’ acquisitions are viewed negatively, while poorly-governed REIT firms’ 
acquisitions are positively received. These results either imply that franchising and REIT 
hotels tend to overinvest or the financial constraints and corporate governance indices do 
not well capture the constraints and governance measures. 
  Furthermore, the negative returns of franchising hotels provide support for the 
other hypothesis (H3b) of agency theory of franchising that monitoring cost of divisional 
managers are higher than the cost of franchisees’ to free ride on the trademark because 
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the expansion of the hotel business may take place in geographic areas that are remotely 
located from the headquarters. However, the negative coefficients of relative deal size in 
all specifications fail to provide support for one of the hypothesis (H3a) drawn from the 
agency theory of franchising, 
2.5 Conclusions 
 This study explains why investments that require substantial capital, such as 
acquisitions, create value in some hotel firms while they reduce value in other firms. The 
hotel industry is chosen to investigate these effects for two reasons. First, building an 
additional hotel requires substantial capital investments and time; and hence, hotel firms 
commonly use mergers and acquisitions as a corporate strategy to accelerate their 
expansions (Canina et al., 2010). Second, contrary to the firms in other industries, such as 
manufacturing industries, hotel firms extensively utilize franchising investment, which 
require little or no capital investment, to expand their operations. Therefore, hotel 
industry provides a unique setting to investigate the effects of under- and overinvestment 
problems on the firm value.  
 On the one hand, financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly higher 
returns than unconstrained firms, suggesting that acquisitions could be a way of dealing 
with the informational asymmetries for constrained firms; firms with underinvestment 
problems move toward the optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized, 
by undertaking an additional investment.  
 On the other hand, dictatorship firms experience negative gains from the 
acquisitions relative to the democracy firms, suggesting that managers of hotel firms that 
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are protected by more ATPs destroy value by overinvesting in negative NPV projects and 
shift firms away from the optimal investment level.  
 While both under- and overinvestment problems are problematic for the firm, the 
joint examination of the effects of financial constraints and corporate governance 
mechanisms on acquirer returns suggests that underinvestment problems are more 
destructive for the firm. In other words, underinvestment problems has more effect on 
firm value than overinvestment problems, which suggest that weak corporate governance 
mechanisms, albeit detrimental, asymmetric information or financial constraints have 
more effect on firm value than poor governance mechanisms. However, most of the firms 
in this study sample appear to have weak corporate governance mechanisms. That is, 
although the degree of financial constraints has relatively more effect on firms’ value, 
overinvestment is more common problem than underinvestment in the hotel industry.  
 Furthermore, shareholders of franchising firms perceive acquisitions negatively, 
which suggests that the franchising firms overinvest. Similarly, hotel-REITs’ acquisitions 
are viewed negatively, which indicates that these firms face overinvestment problems. 
However, the overinvestment problem does not seem to be due to weak corporate 
governance mechanisms, but rather these firms are either over-levered or highly 
expanded prior to making acquisitions. Also, this study provides partial support for the 
agency theory of franchising that the cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that are 
remotely located vis-à-vis the headquarters and hence firms should franchise the division 
that are remotely located from the headquarters rather than owning it. 
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 In summary, the results show that investments that move firms toward the optimal 
investment level affect firm value more than investments that shift firms beyond the 
optimal investment level, relatively. On the one hand, managers of firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms are likely to make poorer acquisitions by undertaking 
value-decreasing investments, which create overinvestment problems and move firms 
above the optimal investment level. Therefore, corporations need to institute external and 
internal corporate governance mechanisms to control such managerial desire. In 
particular, firms with higher ATPs should eliminate provisions and attract more 
institutional investors to increase the quality of internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms and refrain from value-decreasing acquisitions. On the other 
hand, financially constrained firms are expected to undertake value-increasing 
investments by using the internal resources to mitigate informational asymmetries, which 
create underinvestment problems and forces firms to operate below the optimal 
investment level. Financially constrained firms have limited funds but higher unexploited 
investment opportunities; and thus, they undertake value-increasing projects using 
internal resources or stocks. Financially constrained firms may be able to reduce the 
wedge between external and internal finance in acquisitions, where informational 
asymmetries between the acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in 
relation to the capital markets (Alshwer et al., 2011; Khatami et al., 2014). Therefore, 
financially constrained firms should undertake investments that require substantial capital 
investment through acquisitions, as acquisitions could be a method of reducing 
informational asymmetries for those firms. While franchising could be an alternative 
method of investment that mitigate under- and/or overinvestment problems, the results 
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provide evidence against the general notion in previous studies that examined the theories 
of franchising and found that franchising is only due to either capital constraints or 
agency costs (see e.g., Combs & David J., 1999; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). On the 
contrary, franchising firms experience significantly negative gains from acquisitions, 
suggesting that franchising could be a tactic for dealing with overinvestment problems. 
While financially constrained firms may fund the growth opportunities via franchising 
model, franchising firms should take restrictive actions to control managers from making 
acquisitions. Although there seems to be additional factors that might explain why 
unconstrained firms adopt franchising, postulations of the agency theory of franchising 
are partially supported. Hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause 
underinvestment problems; however, it does eliminate overinvestment problems, which 
suggests that distributing the free cash flow to shareholders may halt managerial desire to 
build empires. Hotel-REITs are more likely to make value-increasing investments and 
improvement of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in hotel-REITs 
could make this corporate structure more efficient than C-corporation hotels.  
 Although the findings of the study make significant contributions to the corporate 
finance, franchising, and hospitality literature, this study is not free from limitations. 
While this study reports significant evidence that underinvestment is more depreciating 
than overinvestment, the analyses are limited to gains from acquisitions; hence, future 
studies may examine the effects of different investments on the firm value. Testing the 
underinvestment, overinvestment, and franchising theories using different sample of 
industries would substantiate the results of this study. The results from the OLS analysis 
that examines the effects of corporate governance on the firm value yield low Adjusted 
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R-square values. Although these low values could be seen as a limitation or constraints 
due to small sample size, studies in corporate finance literature that examines these issues 
reports similar results. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who has developed the internal 
corporate governance index using 3,950 observations, report R-square values of 0.02 and 
0.04. Therefore, the small numbers are not due to small sample sizes. Rather, these low 
values are due to the nature of such studies. Although unobservable effects of firms’ 
financial policies and investment opportunities might create omitted variable bias, firms’ 
investment and financial policies and investment opportunities are not disclosed because 
of the crucial competition factors that determine a firm’s success. Instead, alternative 
proxies are used to capture firms’ policies from information available to the public. Yet, 
corporate finance studies may still have low explanatory powers due to the possible 
omitted variables. Therefore, future models employing additional explanatory, macro and 
firm level, variables might improve the explained variance.  
  
		53 
CHAPTER 3 
THE SENSITIVITY OF HOTEL FIRMS’ INVESTMENT TO INTERNAL FUNDS: THE 
ROLE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND AGENCY PROBLEMS 
3.1 Introduction 
 The majority of investments in the hotel industry consists of property, which 
depreciate in value over time and require maintenance, refurbishment, and renewal to 
maintain the level of service demanded by a chain’s customers (Houthakker, 1979; Tsai 
& Gu, 2012). Therefore, to expand nationally or globally hotel corporations often must 
finance major capital expenditures, such as developing/building and acquisitions of hotels 
(Canina et al., 2010), in addition to the financing required to maintain the quality of 
existing properties. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will bypass projects that 
require financing beyond internal resources because raising external finance will make 
some of the projects unprofitable. Therefore, firms will rely on internal funds (i.e., cash 
and cash flow) to undertake capital investments and hence they underinvest. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) argue that firms with high degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity are 
financially constrained and lack the internal funds for making all positive net present 
value investments.
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 However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) dispute the interpretation of the 
coefficients in the investment-cash flow sensitivity regressions and they argue that the 
relationship between internal funds and investments could be due to either financial 
constraints or agency problems related  to empire building. According to Jensen (1986), 
managers of firms with free cash flow may invest beyond the optimal investment level by 
undertaking value-decreasing projects to build empires. Although investors and the 
capital market may enact internal and external governance mechanisms to control 
managers’ actions, these efforts may not fully prevent entrenched managers from 
destroying firm value. Thus, a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow in the hotel 
industry may instead reflect a problem with managers that overinvest (Lamont, 1997). 
 This study examines the sensitivity of capital investments to internal funds to 
determine the extent to which the relationship between internal funds and investments is 
due to financial constraints or to problems with empire building. We consider the 
sensitivity of investments to internal funds for financially constrained firms by using the 
measures of financial constraints found in Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach (2004), 
Hennessy & Whited (2007), Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo (2001) and Whited & Wu 
(2006). The sensitivity of investment to internal funds is expected to be higher for poorly 
governed firms relative to well-governed firms. We measure the quality of corporate 
governance with the number of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs), which are indexed in 
Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2006); (Cremers & Nair, 2005; see e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003), and the existence of major shareholders (Cremers & Nair, 2005; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
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 A further consideration that is important for the hotel industry is the ability to 
expand the supply of  “internal funds” for investment by utilizing the organizational form 
of franchising. Franchising reduces the required capital expenditures of the franchising 
chain, thus allowing investments that require financing beyond the available internal 
funds(Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Franchising also enables firms to expand into 
foreign markets with bearing little or no capital investment risk, where risk is shifted to 
the franchisee in exchange for the franchisor’s expertise and brand name (Alon et al., 
2012) 
However, while franchising could be a beneficial strategy for firms to expand 
their growth, an alternative view is that it could make overinvestment easier for empire-
building CEOs. An investment that requires substantial capital spending could create 
overinvestment problems in franchising firms, if managers of firms with desires to build 
empires use the capital provided by franchisees to undertake investments that are not 
beneficial to shareholders and possibly not even to franchisees. A second goal of this 
study is to examine the effects of franchising in light of the potential role of internal 
funds on investment.  
 The results show the investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially 
constrained firms than for dictatorship firms. However, the majority of the hotel firms 
have weak corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting that hotel firms are exposed to 
empire building problems more than to foregone investments that arise from financial 
constraints. These results suggest that financially constrained firms use mostly internal 
resources for investments because of difficulties in raising external finance. Although 
dictatorship firms also retain internal funds for investments, managers of dictatorship 
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firms tend to use internal resources to undertake value-decreasing projects. Also, firms 
utilize franchising to reduce underinvestment and agency problems.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and develops the study hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
methodology of this study. Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the 
sensitivity of capital and franchising investments to internal funds. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 In a world with friction, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that there is a wedge 
between external and internal finance, and for some firms this wedge might be so high 
that it could make a firm abandon the projects. The main argument is that there is 
asymmetric information between firms and outside investors and borrowers that increases 
the cost of external finance substantially, especially for issuing equity. Akerlof (1970) 
presents a study on the market for lemons that suggests outside, less-informed buyers will 
offer a lower price, and sellers with inside information will not accept the less-informed 
buyers’ terms. The difference between the buyer and seller prices is due to asymmetric 
information between the buyer and seller. In general, the asymmetric information 
problem mainly arises from the conflicts of interest between current and prospective 
shareholders (Greenwald, Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). More 
specifically, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the capital market is imperfect and there 
is an adverse selection problem in raising external funds, while internal funds have no 
adverse selection problem. This will lead to an underinvestment problem that arises from 
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adverse selection, and firms will abandon positive NPV projects that need financing 
beyond this point.  
 Although retaining internal funds could mitigate underinvestment problems, it 
may lead to overinvestment problems if managers use the free cash flow to undertake 
investments that benefit them but not necessarily the shareholders. According to Jensen 
(1986, p. 323) “free cash flow is cash flow in excess of the required funding of projects 
that have positive NPV when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.” Managers have 
incentive to invest the free cash flow to increase their compensations even if the 
investment has negative NPV. Consequently, managers tend to invest more when the firm 
has more internal resources instead of distributing them to the shareholders. Similarly, 
this also makes the investment sensitive to the available internal funds; that is, 
investments increase with the available internal funds. However, in this case, contrary to 
the underinvestment theory, firms face overinvestment problems.  
 In a nutshell, bondholders and shareholders have different incentives, and the 
conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders might leave firms in 
suboptimal investment level. On the other hand, managers and shareholders might have 
different incentives if the manager is not aligned with shareholders, and the conflicts of 
interest between managers and shareholders might cause overinvestment problem.  
 In accordance with the capital market imperfection and asymmetric information 
literature, Fazzari et al. (1988) demonstrate that firms with information problems would 
rely on internal funds to undertake possible positive NPV investments. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) suggest that firms that exhaust all the internal funds available will have greater 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity. Because external finance is costly, firms’ investments 
will be financially constrained to internal finance, and financially constrained firms will 
forgo possible value-increasing projects.  
 . While some empirical studies provide evidence of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, supporting the underinvestment theory (e.g., Fazzari & Peterson, 1993; 
Whited, 1992), others find support for a link between investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and the overinvestment theory (e.g., Christie & Nanda, 1994; Devereux & Schiantarelli, 
1990).  
To overcome the mixed empirical evidence, Vogt (1994) develops an 
identification strategy to analyze the link between investment-cash flow sensitivity and 
underinvestment and overinvestment theories. Accordingly, in firms with Tobin’s Q 
lower than unity, high investment-cash flow sensitivity suggests overinvestment 
distortions, while in firms with Tobin’s Q higher than unity, high investment-cash flow 
sensitivity suggests underinvestment distortions. Results showed that high investment-
cash flow sensitivity could be due to both financial constraints, and hence 
underinvestment problems, and exposure to empire building, and hence overinvestment 
problems, depending on the firm’s investment opportunities measured by Tobin’s Q.  
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that there is no strong theoretical 
reason for investment-cash flow sensitivity to increase monotonically with the degree of 
financial constraints, suggesting that sensitivity of investment to internal funds could be 
due to the managerial desire to build empires. Furthermore, a number of studies show that 
Tobin’s Q is not a reliable measure of financial constraint and/or exposure to empire 
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building because it is generally an inaccurate proxy especially for small firms (Whited & 
Wu, 2006).  
Consequently, alternative measures of financial constraints (see e.g., Almeida et 
al., 2004; Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006) and 
exposure to empire building (or corporate governance) (see e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2006; 
Cremers & Nair, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003) indices have been developed using different 
specifications and variables. Consistent with the financial constraint predictions, Almeida 
et al. (2004); Whited and Wu (2006); Hennessy and Whited (2007); Denis and Sibilkov 
(2009); and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provide evidence that financially constrained 
firms retain greater cash and cash flow than unconstrained firms to overcome 
underinvestment problems. Overall, the theoretical framework of the underinvestment 
problem described by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that the sensitivity of 
investments to internal resources is higher for financially constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms and thus the following hypotheses are offered for testing purposes: 
H1: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. 
H1a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. 
H1b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. 
Internal funds might be difficult to measure because there is not a single accounting item 
(or variable) for the internal funds. Cash and/or cash flows are used as proxies for internal 
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funds in previous studies (see e.g., Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Fazzari et al., 1988) and thus 
the main hypothesis is divided into two testable hypotheses. 
 Although the literature provides substantive evidence on investment sensitivity to 
internal funds, as previously pointed out, it is not clear whether the sensitivity of 
investment to internal funds is due to financial constraints or managers’ desire to build 
empires (Stein, 2003). Using external and internal corporate governance indices 
developed by Gompers et al. (2003); Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); and Bebchuk et al. 
(2006), and Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), respectively, 
Masulis et al. (2007) show that poorly-governed firms (or dictatorship firms) make 
poorer investment decisions compared to well-governed firms (or democracy firms). 
Therefore, the overinvestment theory suggests that poorly-governed firms rely more on 
internal funds to undertake investments than well-governed firms. However, there is no 
known study that investigates the sensitivity of investment to internal funds in the context 
of overinvestment or the managerial desire to build empires using recently developed 
corporate governance indices. Hence, the following hypotheses are drawn from the 
overinvestment theory: 
H2: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for 
democracy firms. 
H2a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for 
democracy firms. 
H2b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for 
democracy firms. 
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 Franchising may help solve these over- and under-investment problems; however, 
it could make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. On the one hand, 
franchising might be a useful corporate strategy to reduce underinvestment problems 
because a new franchised division does not require a substantial capital investment. 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-1969) develop the capital scarcity theory of franchising, 
which is analogous to underinvestment theory, suggesting that small and young firms 
face capital scarcity and hence these firms may expand through franchising when the 
internal funds are not sufficient to undertake company-owned investments. Expansion via 
franchising could be a solution to mitigate underinvestment problems, in which firms 
might expand through franchising when they lack necessary internal funds. Hence, a 
negative relationship between internal funds and proportion of franchised divisions is 
expected. Similarly, a positive relationship between capital investments and internal 
funds is anticipated. The following hypotheses are developed based on the capital 
scarcity theory of franchising: 
H3: Internal funds negatively affect proportion of franchised divisions in financially 
constrained franchising firms. 
H3a: Cash negatively affects the proportion of franchised divisions in financially 
constrained franchising firms.  
H3b: Cash flow negatively affects the proportion of franchised divisions in 
financially constrained franchising firms. 
H4: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms than 
for unconstrained franchising firms. 
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H4a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms than 
for unconstrained franchising firms. 
H4b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms 
than for unconstrained franchising firms. 
 On the other hand, while franchising can be used as a mechanism to reduce 
overinvestment problems, an investment that requires substantial capital spending could 
intensify these problems in the context of hotel expansions. Jensen (1986) argues that 
managers tend to waste the free cash flow by investing in value-decreasing projects, 
instead of distributing it to the shareholders. In particular, managers of franchising firms 
might have excess cash, which is generated through franchising and royalty fees, at their 
discretion and hence they can make bad investment choices when undertaking a 
company-owned hotel investment. While firms could reduce agency problems when 
expanding through franchising because franchising does not require a substantial 
investment, franchising model could exacerbate overinvestment problems when 
expanding via company-owned divisions because managers would have more access to 
cash and might waste firms’ resources. The overinvestment theory suggests that poorly-
governed franchising firms rely more on internal funds to undertake capital investments 
than well-governed franchising firms. The following hypotheses are generated for testing 
purposes:  
H5: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms 
than for democracy franchising firms. 
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H5a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms than 
for democracy franchising firms. 
H5b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms 
than for democracy franchising firms. 
 In the case of the agency theory of franchising, Brickley and Dark (1987) posit 
that the cost of free riding on the trademark is higher in industries with non-repeat 
costumers (non-repeat in terms of one individual division, but not the overall brand), such 
as hotels; hence, firms will expand through company-owned divisions, and monitoring 
cost increases with increased distance from the headquarters; hence, firms will expand 
through franchised divisions. While the former postulation is unrealistic because hotel 
firms rely extensively on franchising, the latter postulation is a general fact that hotels 
almost exclusively expand via franchising in foreign markets, where the distance is 
remote from the headquarters (Graf, 2009). Furthermore, Lafontaine (1992) argues that 
franchisors’ experience in developing a franchise system, as measured by the proportion 
of franchised divisions in the former year, decreases franchisees’ cost of free riding on 
the trademark and hence firms prefer franchising expansion over company-owned 
divisions with increased experience in franchising. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
offered for testing purposes: 
H6: Franchisors’ experience in franchising positively affects proportion of franchised 
divisions.  
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3.3 Methodology 
 The observations with missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis 
and the observations with missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s 
median values. All the variables are winsorized from 1% and 99% levels to remove the 
effects of outliers. Ordinary least square regression analysis may generate spurious 
relationships if the error term is correlated with independent variables. A spurious 
relationship may arise due to omission and/or possible endogeneity of independent 
variables in the model. In general, the determinants of investments, such as firms’ 
financial policies and investment opportunities, are not observable and the relation 
between investment and internal funds might be endogenously determined (Kaplan & 
Zingales, 1997). Although previous studies use Tobin’s Q to account for omitted 
investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q could be an inapt proxy in capturing unobservable 
investment opportunities (Lamont, 1997). Therefore, the analyses are conducted utilizing 
the first-difference Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) panel estimator developed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) to account for possible endogeneity problems that may 
arise due to the unobservable effects of firms’ financial policies and investment 
opportunities and to eliminate firm specific heterogeneity in the model. 
The GMM is a dynamic panel data model that produces asymptotically normal, 
consistent, and efficient coefficient estimates. While the GMM estimator does not require 
the error terms to be normally distributed, the error terms must be free of serial 
correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The GMM allows estimation of unknown 
population parameters using the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor and 
the available sample’s moment conditions, where the difference between sample values 
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of dependent variable and expected values of population parameters approximates to 
zero. Furthermore, lagged independent variables are used as instrumental variables to 
account for the effects of omitted variables and endogeneity problems in GMM (Blundell 
& Bond, 1998).   
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
 The sample of this study consists of public hotel companies in the United States 
(US) that have financial data available on the COMPUSTAT annual database and 
company filings on the US Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) EDGAR at any 
time over the period of 1993-2013. The beginning of the sample period is limited to the 
year 1993 because company filings are only available from the beginning of 1993 at 
SEC. The final sample consists of 312 firm-year observations with 41 unique firms. The 
dependent variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual database and SEC 
EDGAR. The data for constructing the financial constraint indices and independent and 
control variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual database. The Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes the 24 antitakeover provisions (ATP), 
which decrease the ability of the investors to replace the manager, for about 2,000 large 
corporations. However, the publications do not comprise the firms in this study sample. 
Therefore, the data for constructing external governance proxies are hand-collected from 
firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and 10-K statements, certificate of incorporation, 
and the shareholders’ rights plan that are available on the SEC EDGAR. The institutional 
block holdings data, which is used as a proxy for constructing the internal governance 
proxy, is obtained from Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. 
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3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
 The summary statistics of dependent, independent, and grouping variables are 
presented in Table 3.1 along with the correlation matrix of these variables. Three 
different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance indices are used to 
test the extent to which these indices capture the same information in terms of financial 
constraints and exposure to empire building of firms in this study sample.  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Invest
ment Cash 
Cash 
Flow 
KZ 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Cleary 
Index 
BCF 
Index 
Staggered 
Board 
Investment 
(Mil.) 0.10 0.16 1        
Cash (Mil.) 0.07 0.09 0.30a 1       
Cash Flow 
(Mil.) 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.09
c 1      
KZ Index -67.49 93.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.72a 1     
WW Index 1.90 6.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.04 1    
Cleary 
Index -0.37 4.11 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.18
a 0.01 1   
BCF Index 3.58 1.82 -0.07 -0.13a -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.11b 1  
Staggered 
Board 0.69 0.45 0.01 -0.02 0.11
b -0.08c -0.03 0.06 0.30a 1 
Block 
Holdings 0.08 0.14 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests. 
 
 According to the correlation analysis results, investment is positively correlated 
with cash and cash flow, but the correlation between investment and cash is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. While three of the financial constraints 
indices are negatively correlated with cash, none of the correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant. Similarly, three of the corporate governance indices are 
negatively correlated with cash, but the correlation coefficient is only statistically 
significant for the relation between cash and the BCF index. The cash flow is correlated 
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positively with the WW and the Cleary indices and negatively with the KZ index. 
However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation 
between cash flow and the KZ index. Although cash flow is correlated positively with the 
staggered board and block holdings and negatively with the BCF index, the correlation 
coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation between cash flow and the BCF 
index. 
 Furthermore, the KZ index is negatively correlated with the WW index and the 
Cleary index; however, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the 
relation between the KZ index and the Cleary index. Although the sign of the correlation 
coefficient between the WW index and the Cleary index is positive, it is not statistically 
significant. The corporate governance indices are all positively correlated with each 
other. However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation 
between the BCF index and the staggered board. These results suggest that different 
financial constraints and corporate governance indices capture different information in 
regards to firms’ financial constraint levels and the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, the use of different index measures is necessary to capture more 
information about firms’ degrees of financial constraints and exposure to empire 
building. 
3.3.3 Model Specification  
 The dependent variables are the investment as measured by capital expenditures 
(item 128) and the proportion of franchised divisions as measured by the number of 
franchised divisions over the total number of franchised and company-owned divisions. 
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The independent variables are cash, which is measured by cash and short-term 
investments (item 1), and cash flow as measured by the income before extraordinary 
items (item 18) plus depreciation and amortization (item 14). Tobin’s Q might have 
positive or negative effects on investment depending on the firms’ degree of financial 
constraints and exposure to empire building (Fazzari et al., 1988; Vogt, 1997). Jensen 
(1986) suggests that leverage reveals the firm’s exposure to empire building in which 
managers of firms with low leverage and exposure to empire building are likely to 
depreciate firms’ value. Following the literature, size as measured by total assets (item 6); 
Tobin’s Q as measured by total assets (item 6) plus CRSP December Market Equity, 
which is measured by the firm’s December closing price on CRSP (item 199) times 
common shares outstanding (item 25), minus common equity (item 60) minus balance 
sheet deferred taxes (item 74); and leverage (the ratio of total debt [item 9 + item 34] to 
total assets [item 6]) are used to control for firms’ characteristics. Dependent, 
independent, and control variables are adjusted by total book assets (item 6) with the 
exception of the proportion of franchised divisions. Financial constraint and corporate 
governance indices are used as grouping variables to sort firms as constrained and 
unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the degree of financial 
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms, respectively.  
 The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, and the 
Cleary index (Hennessy & Whited, 2007) are utilized to sort the firms as constrained and 
unconstrained based on firms’ financial constraint levels. The, KZ, WW, and Cleary 
financial constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in Lamont 
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et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hennessy and Whited (2007), respectively as 
follows.  
𝐾𝑍 =  −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 –  39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 –  1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 + 3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷   (1) 
𝑊𝑊 =  0.93– 0.09×𝐶𝐹 –  0.06×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑂𝑆 +  0.02×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 –  0.04×𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 + 0.1×𝐼𝑆𝐺 –  0.035×𝑆𝐺                        (2) 
𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 = −0.12×𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇 − 1.90×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 0.001×𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 1.46×𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺 +2.03×𝑆𝐺 − 0.05×𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾                 (3) 
where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus 
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total 
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and short-
term investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q; DIVPOS is 
an indicator that is equal to one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise; TLTD is 
the total long term debt (item 9) divided by total assets (item 6); LNTA is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; ISG is the sample firms’ average sales growth; SG is the firm’s 
real sales growth; CURAT is the current assets (item 4) divided by current liabilities (item 
5); COVER is the interest coverage and measured as earning before interest and taxes 
(item 3 minus item 14) over interest expense (item 15) plus preferred dividend payments 
(item 19) divided by one minus tax rate, where tax rate equals to income taxes (item 16) 
divided by operating income before depreciation (item 13) minus depreciation and 
amortization (item 14) minus interest expense (item 15); IMARG is the net income (item 
18) divided by sales (item 12); and SLACK is the financial slack measured as cash and 
short-term investments (item 1) plus 0.5 times inventory (item 3) plus 0.7 times accounts 
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receivable (item 2) minus short term loans (item 196) divided by net fixed assets (item 8). 
Items are Compustat annual items and the constant term, 0.93, in the WW index is 
obtained from Franzoni (2009). A higher score of the indices indicates more financial 
constraints and hence higher underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two 
portfolios as constrained (upper tercile; i.e., firms that have upper 33% of index values) 
and unconstrained (bottom tercile) based on KZ, WW, and Cleary financial constraint 
index values.   
  Three different corporate governance indices are utilized to identify firms’ 
quality of governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze the effects of the 
external governance mechanism on firm value using an external governance index that 
consists of 24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more ATPs make poorer 
investments. Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role of market for 
corporate control and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn, make it 
difficult to replace the manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost 
between managers and shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires. 
Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2006) examine the effects of the external governance 
mechanism on the value of firms using an alternative index that only consists of six of the 
24 ATPs used by Gompers et al. (2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious 
index negatively affects the firm value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm 
value. The six ATPs are presence of a staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw 
amendments, limit to shareholders charter amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority 
requirement to approve a merger, and poison pills. Along the same line, Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of a staggered board effect on the value of the firm 
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and find that firms with a staggered board of directors have significantly lower firm 
value. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the existence of large investors 
increases the quality of internal governance. Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) and 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism 
using the percentage shareholding by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on 
the firm value and find that firm value increases with increased amount of institutional 
investors. The external governance index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is 
constructed following the criteria used in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are 
the presence of a staggered board, limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on 
amending the charter, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes, 
and poison pill. Basically, the BCF index is the total number of firms’ ATPs that takes 
the value from one to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and 
hence higher overinvestment problems. Following Bebchuk et al. (2006), firms are sorted 
into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the firms’ number of ATPs, where 
firms with three or more ATPs are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms with 
two or less ATPs are included in the democracy portfolio. Also, following Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005), firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the 
presence of a staggered board, where firms with a staggered board are included in the 
dictatorship portfolio, while firms without a staggered board are included in the 
democracy portfolio. As a measure of internal governance mechanism, institutional block 
holdings is utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007). Similarly, firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on 
the firms’ amount of institutional investors, where firms that have institutional ownership 
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5% or less of the firm’s outstanding shares are included in the dictatorship portfolio, 
while firms that have institutional ownership greater than 5% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares are included in the democracy portfolio. 
 The following model is used to analyze the sensitivity of investment to internal 
funds in constrained and unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy firms’ portfolios: 
𝐼!"!! =  𝛽!𝐼!" +  𝛽!𝐶!" +  𝛽!𝐶𝐹!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" +  𝑒!"     (4) 
and the following model is used to examine the determinants of franchising investments: 
𝐹𝐷!" =  𝛽!𝐹𝐷!"!! +  𝛽!𝐶!" +  𝛽!𝐶𝐹!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" +  𝑒!"     (5) 
where I is the firm i’s capital expenditure at time t and t+1, FD is the firm i’s proportion 
of franchised divisions at time t and t-1, C is the firm i’s cash and short term investments 
at time t, CF is the firm i’s cash flow at time t, X represents a set of control variables of 
the firm i at time t that includes the firm’s leverage, Tobin’s Q, and size. 𝑒 is the error 
term and 𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛽! and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters.  
3.4 Empirical Results 
 This section presents the summary statistics and the results of multivariate 
analyses that examine the extent to which sensitivity of investment to internal funds 
varies between constrained and unconstrained; and between dictatorship and democracy 
firms. The multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing first-difference GMM to account 
for the possible endogeneity problem between investment and internal funds; that is, the 
lagged dependent variable is added as an additional explanatory variable and lagged 
independent variables are used as instrumental variables.  
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 Table 3.2 presents the effects of internal funds on investment without classifying 
firms based on the financial constraints or corporate governance indices. Column 1, 2, 
and 3 analyze the sensitivity of investment to cash, cash flow, and cash and cash flow, 
respectively.  
Table 3.2 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Investmentt 0.29a (3.30) 0.33a (3.83) 0.25a (2.96) 
Casht 0.30a (3.00)  0.30a (2.99) 
Cash Flowt  0.21 (1.42) 0.14 (0.97) 
Leveraget 0.13b (2.52) 0.08 (1.62) 0.12b (0.98) 
Tobin’s Qt -0.01 (-0.76) -0.01 (-0.62) -0.01 (-0.37) 
Sizet -0.11a (8.97) -0.12a (-9.11) -0.11a (-8.84) 
Wald Test 301.01a 282.56a 307.84a 
Sargan Test 132.86 147.56 147.47 
AR(1) z-stat. -5.17a -5.10a -5.21a 
AR(2) z-stat. -0.29 -0.05 -0.13 
Number of Obs. 312 312 312 
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are 
in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based 
on two-tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term 
tests of first and second order serial correlations, respectively. 
 
The coefficient of cash in column 1 is positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient of cash flow in column 2 is also positive but it is statistically insignificant. 
Column 3 reports the results of simultaneous inclusion of cash and cash flow variables. 
The analysis yields results similar to those in Column 1 and 2. These preliminary results 
provide support for the relationship between investments and internal funds. However, in 
order to determine the extent to which the sensitivity of investment is due to financial 
constraints and/or exposure to empire building further analyses are conducted sorting 
firms into constrained/unconstrained and democracy/dictatorship portfolios. 
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 Table 3.3 presents the effects of internal funds on investment for the constrained 
and unconstrained firm portfolios. The firms are sorted into constrained and 
unconstrained portfolios based on the KZ, WW, and Cleary indices.  
Table 3.3 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Constrained vs. 
Unconstrained Firms 
 
Financial Constraint 
Criteria KZ Index WW Index Cleary Index 
 Constrained Firms 
Investmentt -0.15 (-0.11) 0.41a (3.32) -0.47b (-2.42) 
Casht 0.50a (3.55) 0.52a (3.08) 0.52a (3.38) 
Cash Flowt 0.43b (2.27) -0.08 (0.28) 0.72a (2.80) 
Leveraget 0.14c (1.79) 0.07 (0.98) 0.22a (2.79) 
Tobin’s Qt 0.01 (0.57) -0.01 (-1.42) 0.03a (3.40) 
Sizet -0.11a (6.05) -0.07a (-2.83) -0.13a (-6.52) 
Wald Test 165.20a 74.77a 205.65a 
Sargan Test 93.07 59.00 50.33 
AR(1) z-stat. -2.03b -1.55 -1.66 
AR(2) z-stat. 0.50 -0.60 0.76 
Number of Obs. 102 103 99 
 Unconstrained Firms 
Investmentt -0.10 (-0.48) -0.32a (-3.55) 0.41a (3.41) 
Casht -0.13 (-0.75) 0.38a (3.09) 0.27c (1.66) 
Cash Flowt 0.41 (1.47) 0.06 (0.34) -0.44 (-1.56) 
Leveraget 0.10 (1.05) 0.12 (1.30) 0.18 (1.46) 
Tobin’s Qt 0.11c (1.74) 0.02a (3.67) -0.01 (-0.18) 
Sizet -0.16a (-4.65) -0.11a (-3.06) -0.17a (-3.88) 
Wald Test 130.94a 172.37a 115.18a 
Sargan Test 39.00 96.01 44.36 
AR (1) z-stat. -1.01 -0.40 -1.58 
AR (2) z-stat. -2.29b -0.20 -0.01 
Number of Obs. 111 106 115 
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-
tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first 
and second order serial correlations, respectively.	
 
Prior to interpreting the coefficient estimates, overall significance of the model, validity 
of instruments, and the presence of serial correlation in the error terms must be 
investigated. Wald statistic, which is a test of the joint significance of the coefficient 
estimates, shows that the coefficients are jointly significant. The Sargan test of over-
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identifying restrictions is employed to examine the validity of the instrumental variables 
as recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998). The Sargan test statistic has the null 
hypothesis of instrumental validity. The results suggest that the variables used to account 
for possible endogeneity problems are valid instruments. Also, the first, AR(1), and 
second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests, which have the null hypotheses of no serial 
correlations, are used following Arellano and Bond (1991). According to the results, the 
error terms have no serial correlations and thus it can be proceed with the interpretation 
of coefficient estimates. The results show that the sensitivity of investment to cash is 
positive and significant for constrained firms’ portfolio based on three of the financial 
constraint indices, and the coefficients are greater relative to the sensitivity of investment 
to cash in unconstrained firms’ portfolio. Specifically, the sensitivity of investment to 
cash is 0.50 (p<0.01), 0.52 (p<0.01), and 0.52 (p<0.01) for constrained firms, while it is -
0.13, 0.38 (p<0.01), and 0.27 (p<0.1) for unconstrained firms based on the KZ, WW, and 
Cleary indices. The investment-cash flow sensitivity is also greater for constrained firms 
than for unconstrained firms based on the KZ and Cleary indices, and the relationship is 
positive and significant for constrained firms. Although the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is smaller for constrained firms’ portfolio than for unconstrained firms’ 
portfolio, it is not significant for either of the portfolios based on the WW index. Overall, 
the results support the hypotheses (H1: H1a and H1b) drawn from the underinvestment 
theory that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is greater for constrained firms 
than for unconstrained firms, suggesting that there is wedge between internal and external 
finances and hence financially constrained firms rely on internal funds to undertake 
value-increasing projects.  
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Table 3.4 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Dictatorship vs. 
Democracy Firms 
 
Governance Criteria BCF Index Staggered Board Block Holdings 
 Dictatorship Firms 
Investmentt 0.33a (3.78) 0.30a (3.36) 0.30a (3.16) 
Casht 0.40b (2.57) 0.14 (1.21) 0.50a (3.38) 
Cash Flowt -0.19 (-0.97) -0.01 (-0.05) 0.23 (1.14) 
Leveraget 0.15a (2.64) 0.10 (1.64) 0.14c (1.68) 
Tobin’s Qt -0.01 (-1.23) -0.01 (-0.49) -0.01 (-0.23) 
Sizet -0.10a (-7.07) -0.13a (7.56) -0.12a (-7.68) 
Wald Test 224.60a 271.76a 165.96a 
Sargan Test 129.53 94.76 108.17 
AR(1) z-stat. -5.24a -4.00a -3.78a 
AR(2) z-stat. 0.56 0.65 -0.66 
Number of Obs. 203 220 187 
 Democracy Firms 
Investmentt -0.23 (-1.29) -0.32c (-1.96) -0.03 (-0.28) 
Casht 0.13 (1.02) 0.47b (2.31) 0.06 (0.51) 
Cash Flowt 0.64a (2.77) 0.28 (1.24) -0.10 (-0.60) 
Leveraget -0.07 (-0.69) -0.08 (-0.67) 0.01 (0.09) 
Tobin’s Qt 0.01b (2.47) 0.02a (2.89) 0.01 (1.16) 
Sizet -0.10a (-3.76) -0.10a (-5.64) -0.12a (-4.18) 
Wald Test 105.07a 96.63a 318.38a 
Sargan Test 62.95 75.22 60.81 
AR(1) z-stat. -3.05a -4.23a -1.87c 
AR(2) z-stat. -1.44 -0.25 0.68 
Number of Obs. 109 92 125 
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-
tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first 
and second order serial correlations, respectively.	
 
 Table 3.4 illustrates the effects of internal funds on investment for the dictatorship 
and democracy firms’ portfolios. The firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy 
portfolios based on the BCF index, the presence of a staggered board, and the amount of 
block holdings. Wald statistics show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each 
model. The Sargan test, which is used to test over-identifying restrictions, statistics 
suggest that the instruments are valid for all the models. The statistics from the first, 
AR(1), and second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests show that the error terms have no 
serial correlations. The results show that the sensitivity of investment to cash is positive 
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and significant for dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the BCF index and the block 
holdings criteria, and the coefficients are greater relative to the sensitivity of investment 
to cash in democracy firms’ portfolio. Particularly, the investment-cash sensitivity is 0.40 
(p<0.05) and 0.50 (p<0.01) for dictatorship firms, while it is 0.13 and 0.06 for democracy 
firms based on the BCF index and the block holdings classifications.  The investment-
cash flow sensitivity, which is positive and statistically significant, is greater in 
democracy firms’ portfolio compared to dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the BCF 
index criterion. Accordingly, firms that have less than five percent institutional investors 
rely more on internal funds than firms that have more than five percent institutional 
investors. In the same vein, investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms, 
in which managers of firms are protected by more ATPs, than for democracy firms. 
However, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not significant for dictatorship firms 
based on any of the corporate governance classifications. More interestingly, although the 
sensitivity of investment to cash is positive for dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the 
presence of a staggered board criterion, it is not statistically significant and it is smaller 
than the investment-cash sensitivity in democracy firms, which may indicate that the 
presence of a staggered board may not be a good proxy for exposure to empire building. 
Overall, the results support the first hypothesis (H2: H2a) drawn from the overinvestment 
theory that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is greater for dictatorship firms 
than for democracy firms. 
 Table 3.5 depicts the determinants of franchising investment for all, constrained, 
and unconstrained franchising firm samples. The firms are classified into financially 
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms based on the WW index. Wald statistics 
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show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions statistics suggests that the instruments are valid for all the models. 
The statistics from the first, AR(1), and second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests show 
that the error terms have no serial correlations. The results show that the relation between 
internal funds (cash and cash flow) and franchising investment is negative for all, 
constrained, and unconstrained franchising firm sample analyses. While the coefficients 
of cash and cash flow are not statistically significant for the analyses of all and 
unconstrained franchising firm samples, the coefficient of cash flow is statistically 
significant for the constrained franchising firm sample analysis. Therefore, the results 
partially support the hypotheses (H3a) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of 
franchising and underinvestment theory, which suggests that financially constrained firms 
expand through franchising to mitigate underinvestment problems. 
Table 3.5 Determinants of Franchising Investments 
 All Franchising Firms Constrained Firms Unconstrained Firms 
Franchised Divisionst-1 0.29c (1.52) 0.41b (1.79) 0.31b (2.18) 
Casht -0.17 (-0.28) -0.59 (-0.65) -0.54c (-1.48) 
Cash Flowt -0.87 (-1.06) -2.97b (-2.01) -0.42 (-0.52) 
Leveraget -0.55b (-2.29) -0.93b (-1.92) -0.43b (-2.02) 
Tobin’s Qt 0.07a (3.55) 0.27a (4.04) 0.01 (0.48) 
Sizet -0.03 (-0.34) -0.32b (-1.90) 0.30a (3.94) 
Wald Test 30.08a 24.16a 132.00a 
Sargan Test 43.73 28.63 41.83 
AR(1) z-stat. -1.25 -1.26 -0.87 
AR(2) z-stat. 0.11 -0.47 0.66 
Number of Obs. 65 34 31 
Franchising Divisions is the dependent variable as measured by the number of franchised divisions 
over number of franchised and owned divisions at year t. Z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c 
indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. All models 
control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first and second order serial 
correlations, respectively.	
 
 The coefficients of lagged dependent variable in Table 5, which signifies 
proportion of franchised divisions in year t-1, are positive for all, constrained, and 
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unconstrained franchising firm sample analyses. Therefore, the results support the 
hypothesis (H6) drawn from the agency theory of franchising that firms expand through 
franchising with increased experience in developing a franchise system, suggesting that 
firms may expand through franchising to eliminate the agency costs of divisional 
managers.  
 The sensitivity of investment to internal funds is further investigated to determine 
if the sensitivity is greater in constrained/unconstrained and dictatorship/democracy 
franchising firms’ portfolios. Table 3.6 presents the results of these analyses. The results 
show that constrained franchising firms rely more on cash than unconstrained franchising 
firms. However, the coefficients of cash flow are statistically insignificant for both 
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms’ portfolios.  
 
These results support the one hypothesis (H4a), while they fail to support the other 
hypothesis (H4b) drawn from the capital scarcity theory. The coefficient of cash on 
Table 3.6 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Franchising 
Firms 
 
Financial 
Constraints/Corporate 
Governance Criteria 
Constrained 
Firms 
Unconstrained 
Firms Dictatorship Democracy 
Investmentt 0.32a (2.58) 0.22b (2.44) 0.25a (4.03) -2.38b (-2.04) 
Casht 0.34c (1.80) -0.27 (-0.91) 0.18 (0.92) -0.19 (-0.48) 
Cash Flowt -0.10 (-0.53) 0.48 (0.79) 0.13 (0.43) 1.94c (1.93) 
Leveraget 0.07 (1.33) -0.04 (-0.58) 0.12b (0.98) -5.45b (-2.07) 
Tobin’s Qt -0.02 (-2.28) 0.01 (0.45) -0.05a (-2.63) -0.16b (-2.48) 
Sizet 0.01 (0.23) 0.08 (0.91) -0.11a (-8.84) 2.15b (2.27) 
Wald Test 163.52a 89.69a 180.91a 222.31a 
Sargan Test 40.64a 33.28a 40.79b 17.46a 
AR(1) z-stat. -2.86a -2.67a -2.64a -1.81c 
AR(2) z-stat. -1.25 1.28 -0.02 -2.51b 
Number of Obs. 45 39 46 38 
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on 
two-tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of 
first and second order serial correlations, respectively. 
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dictatorship firms’ portfolio suggests that poorly governed firms rely more on cash than 
well-governed firms; however, the result is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of 
cash flow is also insignificant for dictatorship firms’ portfolio and it is smaller than the 
coefficient of cash flow in democracy firms’ portfolio. These results could be due to 
either small sample size or that the corporate governance index does not measure the 
overinvestment problems well.  
3.5 Conclusions 
 While both underinvestment and overinvestment theories suggest that the 
availability of internal funds increases investments (Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984), it is less well understood the extent to which the investment-
internal funds sensitivity differs between firms with underinvestment problems and firms 
with overinvestment problems. This study investigates the role of internal funds on 
capital investments in the hospitality industry based on the firms’ degree of financial 
constraints and exposure to empire building. Firms are classified into constrained and 
unconstrained portfolios using the KZ, WW, and Cleary financial constraint indices and 
the results show that financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do 
unconstrained firms. This finding suggests that financially constrained hotel chains 
accumulate internally generated funds to undertake value-increasing projects.  
 Firms are further categorized as dictatorship and democracy portfolios using the 
BCF index, the presence of a staggered board, and the amount of institutional 
shareholders in order to determine the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to 
internal funds varies between dictatorship and democracy firms. The results indicate that 
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investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms, which are likely 
overinvesting due to empire building managers. The results substantiate the 
overinvestment theory propositions of Jensen (1986) and indicate that shareholder value 
is more likely to be maximized in democratic hotel firms.   
 The determinants of franchising investments are analyzed to examine the 
predictions of the agency and capital scarcity theories. The results show that the 
relationship between the proportion of franchised units and internal funds is not 
significant when the analysis is conducted by pooling all the firms that adopt franchising 
in a single sample. However, this relationship might be different for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms, this study resolves the methodological flaw that 
exists in previous empirical studies testing the capital scarcity theory of franchising 
regarding the identification of firms’ financial constraint levels. Using financial 
constraint indices, firms that adopt franchising are further sorted into financially 
constrained and unconstrained categories in order to compare the extent to which 
constrained and unconstrained firms depend on internal funds to undertake franchising 
investments. The relation between proportion of franchised units and cash flow is 
negative for financially constrained firms, suggesting that financially constrained firms 
expand through franchising when they lack internal resources. Conversely, the 
coefficients of cash and cash flow are not statistically significant for unconstrained firms, 
as these firms may adopt franchising for reasons other than financial constraints, one of 
which is the monitoring cost of divisional managers. 
 To summarize, financially constrained firms allocate greater cash and cash flow 
than unconstrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems, while managers of 
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dictatorship firms retain more cash and cash flow than democracy firms to build empires. 
Although both underinvestment and overinvestment theories suggest that investment 
increases with the available internal funds, they have different policy implications. 
Underinvestment theory suggests that firms should retain internal funds to undertake 
investments, while overinvestment theory suggests that firms should distribute the 
internal funds to the shareholders and raise debt to undertake further investments. 
According to the results from the analyses of this study, it can be argued that investment-
internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially constrained firms than for dictatorship 
firms. These results suggest that financially constrained firms use mostly internal 
resources for investments because of difficulties in raising external finance due to 
asymmetric information. Although dictatorship firms also retain internal funds for 
investments, these firms could raise external funds to undertake value-increasing 
projects; however, managers of dictatorship firms tend to use internal resources to 
undertake value-decreasing projects due to the managerial desire to build empires. This 
study advances the underinvestment and overinvestment literature by showing the extent 
to which the sensitivity of investment to internal funds differs between financially 
constrained and dictatorship firms. 
 The findings of this study have practical implications. Accordingly, hospitality 
firms should allocate internal resources efficiently based on the degree of financial 
constraints and exposure to empire building to adjust investments to reach the optimal 
investment level, where the firm value is maximized. On the one hand, firms with 
overinvestment problems should eliminate the ATPs to increase the quality of external 
governance mechanism. Reducing the number of ATPs will not only increase the quality 
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of external governance mechanism, but it may also drive more institutional investors to 
the firm, which increases the quality of internal governance and controls managerial 
desire to build empires. Increased quality of internal and external governance will force 
managers to distribute the internal resources to the shareholders and to raise external 
funds for undertaking positive NPV projects. On the other hand, financially constrained 
firms should retain the internal funds to finance all the positive NPV projects to alleviate 
the informational asymmetries and to reach the optimal investment level. This study 
further contributes to an explanation of the capital scarcity and agency theory of 
franchising by examining determinants of franchising investments in hotel firms. 
Accordingly, firms adopt franchising due to both capital scarcity and agency cost, 
suggesting that franchising could be a way of dealing with asymmetric information and 
the monitoring cost of divisional managers. Therefore, financially constrained firms may 
expand through the franchising model when they lack internal resources to undertake 
value-increasing projects. 
 Despite its contribution to the corporate finance and franchising literature, this 
study has limitations. Although the findings of this study provide significant evidence 
that financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do dictatorship firms, 
the analyses are limited to the sensitivity of investment to internal funds comparisons. 
Therefore, future research may investigate the role of internal funds on firm value to 
determine the extent to which internal funds affect firm value in financially constrained 
and dictatorship firms. While the determinants of franchising investments are analyzed to 
test the agency and capital scarcity theories of franchising, future studies are necessary to 
examine the determinants of capital investments and the extent to which franchising and 
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capital investments affect firm value. Moreover, although the results might be 
generalizable to firms in other industries, the analyses are limited to hotel firms. Thus, 
testing the theories of underinvestment, overinvestment, and franchising in sample groups 
from different industries would corroborate the findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE VALUE OF CASH HOLDINGS IN HOTEL FIRMS: THE ROLE OF FRANCHISING, 
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
 The hotel business is one of the most capital-intensive industries in the service 
industry (Houthakker, 1979; Tsai & Gu, 2012) because a substantial capital investment is 
required to build a new hotel property or to renovate an existing one. Therefore, hotel 
firms may need external funds to develop and/or acquire an additional hotel property, 
which are common investment strategies in the hotel industry (Canina et al., 2010). 
However, the high cost of external finance could turn a positive net present value (NPV) 
of an investment to negative due to asymmetric information problems between the 
company and outside investors. Firms that face asymmetric information problems do not 
undertake all positive NPV investments that require financing beyond the available 
internal funds because the opportunity cost of internal finances may be lower than the 
opportunity cost of external finances (Myers & Majluf, 1984). As a result, such firms 
encounter underinvestment problems due to financial constraints. In other words, they 
rely more heavily on internal resources (i.e., cash holdings) to fund their growth due to 
the high cost of external finance.
		86 
  
Therefore, retained cash can be more valuable for financially constrained firms 
relative to unconstrained firms. A stream of corporate finance literature finds empirical 
evidence that financially constrained firms hold more cash and retain more of their cash 
flows than unconstrained firms (Almeida et al., 2004). Furthermore, Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009) show that the marginal value of cash 
holdings is higher for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. This 
study examines the effects of financial constraints on the marginal value of cash in the 
hotel industry. The marginal value of cash is expected to be higher for financially 
constrained hotel firms. 
 Although greater cash holdings may reduce underinvestment problems, it may 
cause overinvestment problems. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with free 
cash flows and unused borrowing powers are more likely to complete negative NPV 
projects and hence greater cash holdings might be less valuable in poorly-governed firms. 
Studies by Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
report results that are consistent with the view that the marginal value of cash is lower in 
firms with agency problems or poor governance mechanisms. This study investigates the 
role of corporate governance mechanisms on the marginal value of cash in the hotel 
industry. Shareholders would place greater value on the marginal cash holdings in well-
governed firms relative to poorly-governed firms because empire-building CEOs might 
waste the retained marginal cash by investing in value-decreasing projects.   
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 Even if firms retain internally generated funds in order to eliminate 
underinvestment problems, internal funds may not be sufficient to undertake all value-
increasing projects. As an alternative, hotel firms may expand their businesses via the 
franchising business investment model, in addition to developing hotel properties or 
making acquisitions. The capital scarcity theory of franchising suggests that firms utilize 
franchising when they lack the necessary capital to fund their growth because franchisor 
firms do not need substantial capital resources for franchising investments (Hunt, 1973; 
Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Real estate properties comprise the majority of 
investments in the hotel industry and they require periodic capital expenditures for 
maintenance, renovation, and restoration to sustain the quality of service provided. 
Franchising could especially be beneficial for franchisors in the global market because it 
allows them to expand into foreign markets while undertaking little or no capital 
investment risk. In franchising, the risk is transferred to franchisees in exchange for the 
franchisor’s know-how and trademark (Alon et al., 2012). While franchising might be a 
practical tool for expansion when firms lack necessary internal resources, the marginal 
cash might be more valuable for franchising firms because it allows firms to undertake a 
company-owned hotel investment. Shareholders of franchising firms will place greater 
value on cash, if franchising is viewed as an investment method to mitigate 
underinvestment problems. 
 Franchising may help solve underinvestment problems, but in the context of hotel 
expansion it may exacerbate overinvestment problems. Although hotel firms extensively 
rely on franchising for their growth, they continue to make acquisitions, which requires 
substantial capital expenditures. The acquisition strategy enables hotel companies to 
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grow quickly in both domestic and foreign markets by eliminating the time required for 
developing a new hotel project from the ground up. However, an investment that requires 
substantial capital spending could be an overinvestment because managers that desire to 
build empires may undertake value-decreasing investments with the excess cash holdings 
generated through franchising and royalty fees. Shareholders of franchising firms will 
place lower value on cash if franchising is perceived to worsen overinvestment problems.  
 Overall, greater cash holdings could eliminate underinvestment problems or 
create overinvestment problems. Extant studies show that the marginal value of cash is 
greater for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms (see e.g., 
Faulkender & Wang, 2006) and it is lower for poorly-governed firms than for well 
governed firms (see e.g., Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). However, little is known which 
of these problems has a greater effect on the marginal value of cash. Furthermore, many 
hotel chains start business with few wholly owned establishments, and instead expand 
rapidly via franchising. Yet, why firms choose franchising investment model is not clear. 
While firms may expand through franchising when they lack internal resources, 
franchising might aggravate overinvestment problems. However, this is ultimately an 
empirical question.  
 The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which franchising, financial 
constraints, and corporate governance affect the marginal value of cash in hotel firms. 
First, the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is investigated in order 
to determine the marginal value of cash holdings in hotel firms. Second, the effects of 
financial constraints and corporate governance on the relation between marginal cash 
holdings and firm value are examined in order to determine the extent to which 
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asymmetric information or agency problems are more costly for firms. Lastly, the effect 
of franchising on the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is analyzed 
in order to determine why firms adopt franchising investment.  
 The results show that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially 
constrained hotel firms than for unconstrained hotel firms, while it is lower for poorly-
governed firms than for well-governed firms. The coefficient of marginal cash is greater 
for financially constrained firms than for poorly-governed firms, suggesting that the 
asymmetric information problem is more costly than agency problems. The results from 
the examination of the marginal value of cash holdings in firms that expand through 
franchising indicates that franchising could be utilized as a solution for underinvestment 
problems in financially constrained firms; however, it seems to magnify overinvestment 
problems in poorly-governed firms.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology of this study. 
Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the effects of financial constraints, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and franchising on the marginal value of cash. 
Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 An extensive body of research suggests that external and internal finances are not 
perfect substitutes. Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that entrepreneurs experience 
difficulties conveying true information of their firm to the market and thus firms with 
asymmetric information problems forego possible growth opportunities because external 
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finance is so costly. Fazzari et al. (1988) show that firms are financially constrained if 
their investments are highly sensitive to internal funds (i.e., cash and cash flows). While 
Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that high investment-internal funds sensitivity indicates that 
firms are financially constrained in their investments, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue 
that investment cash-flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraint 
because it may also be an indication of overinvestments of free cash flows. Jensen (1986) 
suggests that managers of firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing powers are 
more likely to complete negative NPV projects. In other words, a firm could have high 
level of exposure to empire building, if the manager seeks private benefits.  
 A number of studies have developed methods that measure firms’ quality of 
corporate governance mechanisms and degree of financial constraints. Gompers et al. 
(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2006) have developed indices based on antitakeover 
provisions (or ATPs, legal regulations that shield firms against hostile takeovers) that 
measure the quality of external governance mechanism, which is known as the market for 
corporate control that prevents management from undertaking value-decreasing projects. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the presence of larger shareholder groups 
increases the quality of internal governance. Cremers and Nair (2005) have developed a 
measure that can assess the quality of internal governance mechanism based on the 
amount of institutional investors in a firm. Similarly, several indices have been developed 
that measure firms’ degree of financial constraints based on the information that firms 
disclose on their financial reports (see e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010; 
Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006). 
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 Consistent with the underinvestment theory, Almeida et al. (2004); Whited and 
Wu (2006); Hennessy and Whited (2007); Denis and Sibilkov (2009); and Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) show that financially constrained firms hold more of their cash and cash 
flow than unconstrained firms to overcome financial constraints. Furthermore, 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) provide evidence that the value of cash is greater for 
financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. More recently, Denis and 
Sibilkov (2009) find evidence supporting the previous theoretical and empirical studies 
that the marginal value of cash holdings is higher for financially constrained firms than 
for unconstrained firms. In general, financially constrained firms are expected to use 
internal resources to maximize the firm value by undertaking value-increasing projects. 
Therefore, shareholders of financially constrained firms place greater value on cash than 
unconstrained firms because the marginal cash in financially constrained firms reduces 
the underinvestment problems that arise due to the asymmetric information problem (i.e., 
the wedge between external and internal finances). Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses are offered based on the theoretical framework of underinvestment: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and firm value.  
H1b: The marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms.  
 Although the literature provides substantial evidence that the value of cash varies 
across firms based on the degree of financial constraints, a different stream of literature 
show that cash has lower value in poorly-governed firms and in firms with agency 
problems. Pinkowitz et al. (2006), investigating the effects of corporate governance 
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mechanisms on the value of internal funds, show that the value of cash is lower in firms 
with agency problems or weak governance practices relative to well-governed firms. 
Similarly, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) provide empirical support consistent with this 
view that the marginal value of cash is lower in firms with agency problems or poor 
governance mechanisms. In other words, shareholders of weakly governed firms place 
lower value on the marginal cash holdings. Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate evidence in 
favor of the overinvestment theory that managers of poorly-governed firms make poorer 
investments relative to managers of well-governed firms. Therefore, managers of poorly-
governed firms retain internal funds to undertake investments that benefit them but not 
necessarily the shareholders; that is, managers of firms with desire to build empires may 
waste the marginal cash in value-decreasing projects and create overinvestment 
problems. Accordingly, overinvestment theory predicts the following hypotheses: 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and firm value.  
H2b: The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed firms than for well-
governed firms. 
 While Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms bypass projects that require 
external finance due to asymmetric information problems, financially constrained firms 
might utilize franchising to eliminate such underinvestment problems. If a firm is 
financially constrained, franchising might help because franchising requires little or no 
capital investment and immediately generates cash flows. Oxenfeldt and Thompson 
(1968-1969) propose the capital scarcity theory of franchising to explain why firms adopt 
it. According to this theory, firms that cannot raise external finance choose the 
		93 
franchising business investment model for expansion and growth. While there are a 
number of studies that examine determinants of franchising investment, results are 
mixed. However, previous studies that test the capital scarcity theory of franchising 
assume a monotonic relationship between firms’ internal resources and franchising 
investments (see e.g., Brickley et al., 1991; Combs & David J., 1999). The capital 
scarcity of firms may vary across firms and hence while some firms adopt franchising 
due to capital scarcity, other may adopt franchising for different reasons. That is, the 
capital scarcity theory’s propositions may only pertain to financially constrained firms. 
Therefore, the hypothesis, which postulates that all franchising firms face financial 
constraints, is inappropriately deduced from the capital scarcity theory in former 
empirical studies. A method that measures firms’ degree of financial constraints is 
necessary to test the extent to which firms adopt franchising due capital scarcity or 
financial constraints. Recently developed financial constraint indices (see e.g., Almeida et 
al., 2004; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010; Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001; 
Whited & Wu, 2006) could be used to measure the extent to which firms face financial 
frictions and hence rely on internal resources and/or franchising for investments.   
 Although financially constrained firms could adopt franchising as a solution to 
underinvestment problem, firms that adopt franchising might as well face overinvestment 
problems if they are exposed to empire building. In other words, managers’ mission 
might not be aligned with that of shareholders. In the case of franchising firms, cash 
flows generated through franchisees might lead managers to undertake value-decreasing 
investments that require substantial capital spending such as mergers and acquisitions 
(Lang et al., 1991). Such deals have been very frequent in hospitality industry in the last 
		94 
two decades, with over 800 mergers and acquisitions (Chatfield, Chatfield, & Dalbor, 
2012). Consequently, managers of hospitality firms might invest in negative NPV 
projects with the cash flow generated through franchised divisions rather than distributing 
dividends to shareholders.  
 Accordingly, shareholders of franchising firms will place greater value in cash, if 
franchising is pursued as an investment method to mitigate underinvestment problems. 
However, shareholders will place a lower value on franchising firms if franchising is 
viewed as exacerbating overinvestment problems. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
proposed based on the franchising theories: 
H3: There is a relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and the value of 
franchising firm. 
 While a positive relationship between the marginal cash and firm value suggests 
that firms expand through franchising to eliminate underinvestment problems, a negative 
relationship between the marginal cash and firm value indicates that franchising 
exacerbates overinvestment problems. It is also possible that some firms adopt 
franchising to reduce underinvestment problems, while for other firms the choice to use 
franchising is related to overinvestment problems. On the one hand, the marginal value of 
cash is expected to be higher for financially constrained firms that use franchising than 
for unconstrained franchising firms. On the other hand, shareholders of poorly-governed 
franchising firms will place lower value on cash relative to well-governed franchising 
firms. Therefore, the following hypotheses are drawn from the theoretical frameworks of 
under- and overinvestment, respectively:   
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H4: The marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained franchising firms 
than for unconstrained franchising firms. 
H5: The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed franchising firms than for 
well-governed franchising firms. 
4.3 Methodology 
 Multivariate analyses are employed to uncover the extent to which the marginal 
value of cash differs between constrained and unconstrained; between dictatorship and 
democracy; and between franchising and non-franchising firms. The observations with 
missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis and the observations with 
missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s median values. All the variables 
are winsorized from 1% and 99% level to eliminate the effects of outliers.  
Ordinary least square (OLS) analysis may yield biased standard errors if the 
Gauss-Markov assumptions of OLS are violated. Therefore, the residuals of the model 
must be diagnosed to determine whether the estimated coefficients are best linear and 
unbiased (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003). The residuals are diagnosed for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation utilizing White (1980) and Wooldridge (2002) 
tests, respectively. However, the models’ residuals appear to suffer from 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Wooldridge (2002) recommends the use 
of feasible generalized least square (FGLS) because it corrects for the heterogeneity and 
autocorrelation and produces robust standard errors. Therefore, multivariate analyses are 
conducted utilizing FGLS to account for the heterogeneity and autocorrelation problems 
in the models. Furthermore, FGLS produces asymptotically normally distributed 
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coefficient estimates, which relaxes the normality assumption of the OLS (Parks, 1967). 
Variance Inflation factors are further assessed for multicollinearity and all the values in 
all the models yield acceptable results. Hence, the estimated parameters of the models are 
reliable. 
 The following models are applied to examine the relationship between marginal 
cash and the firm value and the marginal value of cash for financially constrained, 
poorly-governed, and franchising firms relative to unconstrained, well-governed, and 
firms, which do not adopt franchising, respectively: 
𝐸𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝐶!"𝐹𝐶 + 𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"   (1) 𝐸𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝐶!"𝐺 + 𝐺 + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"   (2) 
𝐸𝑅!" =  𝑎! +  𝛽!𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑀𝐶!"𝐹 + 𝐹 + 𝛽!𝑋!"!!!!  +  𝑒!"   (3) 
where ER is the firm i’s excess stock returns at time t, MC is the firm i’s change 
in cash at time t, FC is a financial constraints dummy variable, G is a corporate 
governance dummy or index variable, F is the franchising dummy variable, and X 
represents a set of control variables of the firm i at time t that includes the change in non-
cash, change in earnings, leverage, and net financing. 𝑒 is the error term and 𝑎!, 𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛽!, 𝛽!, and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters. 
4.3.1 Data and Variable Construction 
 The sample of this study consists of public hotel companies in the United States 
(US) over the period of 1993-2013. The sample period begins in 1993 because company 
filings are only available then through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
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EDGAR database. The dependent, independent, and control variables and the data for 
constructing the financial constraint indices are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual 
database. The institutional block holdings data, which is used as a proxy for constructing 
the internal governance proxy, is obtained from Thomson Financial Institutional 
Holdings (13F) Database. The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes 
the 24 antitakeover provisions (ATP), which decrease the ability of the investors to 
replace the manager, for about 2,000 large corporations. However, the publications do not 
comprise the firms in this study sample. Therefore, the data for constructing external 
governance proxies are hand-collected from firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and 
10-K statements, certificate of incorporation, and the shareholders’ rights plan that are 
available on the SEC EDGAR. The final sample consists of 392 firm-year observations 
with 41 unique firms. 
 The dependent variable, excess stock return (or firm value), is the stock return 
over a fiscal year minus the return on a beta-matching portfolio. The benchmark portfolio 
is adapted from the forty-eight Fama- French value-weighted portfolios. Accordingly, the 
excess stock return is calculated as follows.  
𝑅!" =  !!" !!"!! − 1         (4) 
𝐸𝑅!" =  𝑅!" − 𝐵𝑅!"         (5) 
where 𝑅 is the excess stock i’s return during year t; 𝑃 is the fiscal year closing price for 
stock i on year t (item 199); 𝐸𝑅 is the excess stock i’s return during year t; 𝐵𝑅 is the 
return of stock i’s benchmark portfolio during year t.   
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 The independent variable is the change in cash (or marginal cash), which is 
measured by cash and short-term investments (item 1) in year t minus cash and short-
term investments in year t-1. Based on the methodology used in the studies of Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009), the following variables are included in 
the models to control for the changes in the firm’s profitability and book assets net of 
cash and the firm’s leverage and net financing. Change in non-cash is measured by book 
assets (item 6) in year t minus book assets in year t-1 less change in cash; change in 
earnings is measured as interest (item 15) plus earnings before extraordinary items (item 
18) deferred taxes credits (item 50), and investment tax credits (item 51) in year t minus 
earnings in year t-1; leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt (item 9 + item 
34) to total assets (item 6) in year t; and net financing, which is measured by the sale of 
common and preferred stock (item 108) minus purchase of common and preferred stock 
(item 115) plus long term debt issuance (item 111) minus long term debt redemption 
(item 114). Independent and control variables are adjusted by lagged market equity, 
which is defined as the number of common shares (item 54) times the fiscal year closing 
price for stock i on year t (item 199), with the exception of leverage. Therefore, the 
coefficient of change in cash indicates the marginal value of cash. Corporate governance 
and financial constraint indices are applied to categorize firms as constrained and 
unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the degrees of 
financial constraints and corporate governance mechanisms, respectively. Furthermore, 
constrained (FC), governance (G) and franchising (F) dummy variables are created, 
where FC takes the value of one if the firm is financially constrained and zero otherwise; 
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G takes the value of one if the firm is poorly-governed and zero otherwise; and F takes 
the value of one if the firm is a franchising company and zero otherwise.  
 Three financial constraint indices are utilized to measure firms’ financial 
constraint levels. Specifically, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) index, the Cleary 
index (Hennessy & Whited, 2007), and the Size and Age (SA) index are utilized to 
classify firms as constrained and unconstrained. The, KZ, Cleary, and SA financial 
constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in Lamont et al. 
(2001), Hennessy and Whited (2007), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), respectively as 
follows.  
𝐾𝑍 =  −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 –  39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 –  1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 + 3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷   (6) 
𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 = −0.12×𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇 − 1.90×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 0.001×𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 1.46×𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺 +2.03×𝑆𝐺 − 0.05×𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾                    (7) 
𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.043×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!– 0.040×𝐴𝑔𝑒       (8) 
where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus 
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total 
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and short-
term investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q; TLTD is 
the total long term debt (item 9) divided by total assets (item 6); SG is the firm’s real 
sales growth; CURAT is the current assets (item 4) divided by current liabilities (item 5); 
COVER is the interest coverage and measured as earning before interest and taxes (item 3 
minus item 14) over interest expense (item 15) plus preferred dividend payments (item 
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19) divided by one minus tax rate, where tax rate equals to income taxes (item 16) 
divided by operating income before depreciation (item 13) minus depreciation and 
amortization (item 14) minus interest expense (item 15); IMARG is the net income (item 
18) divided by sales (item 12); and SLACK is the financial slack measured as cash and 
short-term investments (item 1) plus 0.5 times inventory (item 3) plus 0.7 times accounts 
receivable (item 2) minus short term loans (item 196) divided by net fixed assets (item 8). 
Size is natural logarithm of total assets; and Age is the number of years the firm has been 
on Compustat with non-missing financial data information. Items are Compustat annual 
items. A higher score of the indices indicates more financial constraints and hence higher 
underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two portfolios as constrained (upper 
tercile; i.e., firms that have upper 33% of index values) and unconstrained (bottom 
tercile; i.e., firms that have lower 33% of index values) based on the KZ, Cleary, and SA 
financial constraint index values.   
  Three corporate governance indices are utilized to identify firms’ quality of 
governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze the effects of the external 
governance mechanism on firm value using an external governance index that consists of 
24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more ATPs make poorer investments. 
Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role of market for corporate control 
and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn, make it difficult to replace the 
manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost between managers and 
shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. 
(2006) examine the effects of the external governance mechanism on the value of firms 
using an alternative index that only consists of six of the 24 ATPs used by Gompers et al. 
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(2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious index negatively affects the firm 
value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm value. The six ATPs are presence of 
a staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw amendments, limit to shareholders charter 
amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, and 
poison pills. Similarly, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of a 
staggered board effect on the value of the firm and find that firms with a staggered board 
of directors have significantly lower firm value. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
show that the existence of large investors increases the quality of internal governance. 
Along the same line, Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism using the percentage shareholding 
by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on the firm value and find that firm 
value increases with increased amount of institutional investors. The external governance 
index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is constructed following the criteria used 
in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are the presence of a staggered board, 
limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on amending the charter, 
supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes, and poison pill. 
Basically, the BCF index is the total number of firms’ ATPs that takes the value from one 
to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and hence higher 
overinvestment problems. Following Bebchuk et al. (2006), firms are sorted into 
dictatorship (i.e., poorly-governed) and democracy (i.e., well governed) portfolios based 
on the firms’ number of ATPs, where firms with three or more ATPs are included in the 
dictatorship portfolio, while firms with two or less ATPs are included in the democracy 
portfolio. Also, following Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), firms are sorted into dictatorship 
		102 
and democracy portfolios based on the presence of a staggered board, where firms with a 
staggered board are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms without a staggered 
board are included in the democracy portfolio. As a measure of internal governance 
mechanism, institutional block holdings is utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005) 
and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Similarly, firms are sorted into dictatorship and 
democracy portfolios based on the firms’ amount of institutional investors, where firms 
that have institutional ownership 5% or less of the firm’s outstanding shares are included 
in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms that have institutional ownership greater than 5% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares are included in the democracy portfolio. 
4.3.2 Summary Statistics 
 The summary statistics of dependent and independent, financial constraints, and 
corporate governance index variables are presented in Table 4.1 along with the 
correlation matrix of these variables.  
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Excess 
Return Cash 
KZ 
Index 
SA 
Index 
Cleary 
Index 
BCF 
Index 
Staggered 
Board 
Excess Return -8.56 26.43 1       
Cash  0.07 0.09 -0.11b 1      
KZ Index -67.49 93.01 -0.10b -0.07 1     
SA Index 1.90 6.03 -0.22a -0.05 -0.04 1    
Cleary Index -0.37 4.11 0.05 0.05 -0.18a 0.01 1   
BCF Index 3.58 1.82 -0.02 -0.13a 0.00 0.07 0.11b 1  
Staggered 
Board 0.69 0.45 0.03 -0.02 -0.08
c -0.03 0.06 0.30a 1 
Block 
Holdings 0.08 0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests. 
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Three different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance indices are 
used to assess the extent to which these indices capture the same information in terms of 
financial constraints and corporate governance mechanisms of firms in this study sample. 
While the KZ index is negatively correlated with the Cleary and SA financial constraints 
indices, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation between 
the KZ and Cleary index. Although the sign of the correlation coefficient between the 
Cleary and SA index is positive, it is statistically insignificant. The indices that measure 
the corporate governance mechanisms are positively correlated with each other. 
However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation 
between the BCF index and the staggered board. These results suggest that different 
financial constraints and corporate governance indices capture different information. 
Therefore, the use of different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance 
mechanisms is important to obtain more information about firms’ degrees of financial 
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms. According to the results from the 
correlation analysis, excess return is negatively correlated with cash and the correlation 
coefficient is statistically significant at 5% significant level.  
4.4 Empirical Results 
 This section presents the results of the regression analyses that examine the 
relationship between marginal cash and the firm value, as well as effects of financial 
constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, and franchising the relationship between 
marginal cash and the firm value. Firms are grouped as financially constrained and 
unconstrained and poorly- and well-governed based on the financial constraints and 
corporate governance indices. The relationships are estimated utilizing the FGLS 
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regression analysis to determine the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and franchising on the marginal value of cash in hotel firms. Table 4.2 
presents the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value without 
subjecting the sample to a financial constraints or corporate governance criteria (column 
1) and based on the financial constraint indices controlling for firms’ financial 
characteristics. 
Table 4.2 Value of Cash Holdings: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Firms 
 
 
Financial 
Constraints Criteria No Criteria (1) KZ Index (2) SA Index (3) Cleary Index (4) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
    
Change in cash 
 
2.97a (6.09) 1.80a (3.35) 3.30a (4.87) 1.61b (2.22) 
Constrained*Change 
in Cash 
 
 5.14a (4.97) -0.70 (-0.72) 2.59b (2.52) 
Constrained dummy 
 
 0.47 (0.79) 0.35 (0.44) -0.93 (-1.54) 
Control Variables 
 
    
Change in non-cash 
 
0.04a (13.05) 0.04a (12.42) 0.04a (12.21) 0.04a (11.30) 
Change in earnings 
 
-0.01 (-0.17) -0.01 (-0.28) -0.01 (-0.09) 0.01 (0.97) 
Leverage 
 
0.01 (0.93) 0.01 (1.45) 0.01 (0.97) 0.01 (0.45) 
Net financing 
 
0.01 (0.54) 0.01 (0.83) 0.01 (0.53) 0.01 (0.88) 
Intercept 
 
-33.87a (-19.62) -34.07a (-20.12) -33.97a (-19.54) -33.51a (-19.47) 
Number of obs. 
 
392 392 392 392 
Wald test of joint 
significance 
9184.07 9805.40 9200.52 9383.77 
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight Fama-
French value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z statistics are in 
parentheses. a and b indicate 1 and 5 statistical significance levels, respectively based on two sided tests. 
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 Before interpreting the coefficient estimates, overall significance of the model 
must be investigated. Wald statistic, which is a test of the joint significance of the 
coefficient estimates, shows that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. 
The coefficient of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in Column 1 of Table 2 
shows that the marginal value of cash is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). 
The coefficient of the change in cash shows the value of marginal cash in firms, which is 
2.97 dollar based on the column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 include the financial constraints 
dummy variables and an interaction term in order to capture the difference in the 
marginal value of cash between constrained and unconstrained firms. Although the 
coefficients of change in cash fluctuate between 1.61 and 3.30, they are still positive and 
statistically significant based on the financial constraints criteria in columns 2, 3, and 4. 
KZ and Cleary financial constraints indices provide evidence that cash is more valuable 
in financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms, as the coefficients of the 
interaction term, constrained change in cash, is positive and significant in columns 2 
(p<0.01) and 4 (p<0.05). However, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and 
statistically insignificant based on the SA financial constraints index. Accordingly, the 
marginal value of cash is between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar higher for financially constrained 
firms than for unconstrained firms. Therefore, the results support the underinvestment 
hypotheses (H1a and H1b) that there is a positive relationship between the marginal cash 
and firm value and that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained 
firms than unconstrained firms. In contrast, the results fail to support the hypothesis 
(H2a), based on the overinvestment theory, that there is a negative relationship between 
the marginal cash and firm value. These results support the findings in studies that 
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examine the underinvestment theory (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Faulkender & Wang, 
2006) that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms.  
Table 4.3 Value of Cash Holdings: Poorly vs. Well Governed Firms 
 
Corporate Governance 
Criteria BCF Index (1) Staggered Board (2) Block Holdings (3) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
   
Change in cash 
 
4.79a (6.30) 4.67a (5.48) 2.48a (4.21) 
Governance*Change in 
Cash 
 
-2.97a (-3.09) -2.59b (-2.41) 1.79 (1.53) 
Governance dummy 
 
0.20 (0.34) -0.43 (-0.72) 0.63 (1.06) 
Control Variables 
 
   
Change in non-cash 
 
0.04a (13.54) 0.04a (13.15) 0.04a (12.88) 
Change in earnings 
 
-0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.05) 
Leverage 
 
0.01 (0.66) 0.01 (0.69) 0.01 (0.94) 
Net financing 
 
0.01 (0.35) 0.01 (0.42) 0.01 (0.63) 
Intercept 
 
-33.92a (-19.80) -33.57a (-19.05) -34.15a (-19.58) 
Number of obs. 
 
392 392 392 
Wald test of joint 
significance 
9417.98 9351.75 9277.01 
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight 
Fama-French value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z 
statistics are in parentheses. a and b indicate 1 and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively 
based on two sided tests. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value 
based on the corporate governance indices controlling for firms’ financial characteristics. 
Wald statistics show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The 
coefficients of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in Columns 1, 2, and 3 of 
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Table 4.3 shows that the marginal value of cash, which ranges between 2.48 and 4.79 
dollar, is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). The interaction term, governance 
change in cash, illustrates the difference in the marginal value of cash between poorly 
and well-governed firms. The results from columns 1 and 2 show that cash is less 
valuable in poorly-governed firms relative to well-governed firms, based on the BCF 
index and staggered board criteria, and the coefficients are statistically significant. 
 Although the results from the column 3 demonstrate the opposite, the coefficient 
of the interaction term is statistically insignificant. The marginal value of cash is lower, 
ranging between 2.59 and 2.97 dollar, for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed 
firms. Therefore, the results support the hypothesis (H2b), drawn from the 
overinvestment theory, that the marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed firms 
than for well-governed firms. These results complements the findings in studies that 
examine the overinvestment theory (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 
2006) that the marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy 
firms. 
 Table 4.4 presents the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the 
franchising firm value, controlling for firms’ financial characteristics. Wald statistics 
show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The columns 1, 3, and 4 
of Table 4.4 present the analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the franchising firm 
value when the sample is restricted to franchising firms, while column 2 shows the 
analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value for the full sample and including 
the franchising dummy variable. 
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Table 4.4 Value of Cash Holdings: Franchising Firms 
 
The coefficient of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in column 1 of Table 4.4 
shows that the marginal value of cash is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01). 
The results from the analysis, which is based only the sample of franchising firms, in 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
    
Change in cash 
 
-7.30a (-3.47) 3.28a (6.73) -13.96a (-5.54) 1.07 (0.49) 
Franchising*Change in 
Cash 
 
 -10.98a (-3.66)   
Constrained*Change in 
Cash 
 
  16.55a (4.29)  
Governance*Change in 
Cash 
 
   -22.44a (-6.45) 
Franchising dummy 
 
 0.23 (0.35)   
Constrained dummy 
 
  -0.92 (-1.04)  
Governance dummy 
 
   0.19 (0.23) 
Control Variables 
 
    
Change in non-cash 
 
-0.20 (-0.36) 0.04a (13.23) 0.29 (0.56) 0.18 (0.39) 
Change in earnings 
 
0.01 (0.10) -0.01 (-0.14) -0.01 (-0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 
Leverage 
 
0.01b (2.36) 0.01 (0.63) 0.01c (1.89) 0.01c (1.84) 
Net financing 
 
0.03a (3.91) 0.01 (0.19) 0.02a (3.43) 0.02b (2.40) 
Intercept 
 
-35.11a (-7.47) -33.75a (-19.83) -33.53a (-7.75) -35.12a (-8.95) 
Number of obs. 
 
90 392 90 90 
Wald test of joint 
significance 
5296.17 9512.31 6436.31 7822.52 
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight 
Fama-French value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z statistics 
are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively 
based on two sided tests. 
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column 1 suggests that on average the marginal cash has a negative value in franchising 
firms. To further delineate these findings and to compare the difference in the marginal 
value of cash between franchising and non-franchising firms, a franchising dummy 
variable along with an interaction term of the franchising dummy variable and change in 
cash, franchising change in cash, are included in the model. Column 2 of Table 4.4 shows 
that while the marginal value of cash is positive and significant (3.28, p<0.01), marginal 
cash is less valuable in franchising firms relative to firms that do not adopt franchising.  
Although the findings suggest that franchising firms’ investors put lower value on 
a marginal dollar, it is not clear whether the relatively lower value of marginal cash is due 
to under- or overinvestment problems. To test this intuition, a financial constraints and 
corporate governance dummy variables are included in the analyses in columns 3 and 4 
along with interaction terms, where financial constraints and corporate governance 
dummy variables are interacted with the change in cash variable, respectively. Parallel 
with the results from the analysis presented in column 1 of Table 4.4, the column 3 shows 
that the marginal value of cash is negative and statistically significant in franchising 
firms. Conversely, the results from the analysis in column 4 shows that the coefficient of 
marginal value of cash flips signs and loses significance. Yet, the coefficient of 
interaction term, constrained change in cash, is positive and significant (16.55, p<0.01), 
suggesting that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained 
franchising firms than unconstrained franchising firms. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
interaction term, governance change in cash, is negative and significant (-22.44, p<0.01), 
which indicates that cash is less valuable in poorly-governed franchising firms relative to 
well-governed franchising firms. The results support hypotheses (H3, H4, and H5), 
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which posit that franchising firms differ depending on their financial constraints and 
governance. That is, the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained 
franchising firms than unconstrained franchising firms, while it is lower for poorly-
governed franchising firms compared to well-governed franchising firms.  
4.5 Conclusions 
 In perfect capital markets, where there are no asymmetric information problems, a 
positive NPV project is a value-increasing investment for the firm regardless of how the 
project is financed because the opportunity costs of external (i.e., debt and/or equity) and 
internal resources (i.e., cash) do not diverge. However, firms’ investment and financing 
decisions are not independent of each other. Some firms face underinvestment problems 
if their cash is not sufficient (Myers & Majluf, 1984), while other firms face 
overinvestment problems when managers seek personal benefits from using firms’ 
resources to build empires (Jensen, 1986). This study examines the relationship between 
firm value and marginal cash in the hotel industry based on the firms’ degrees of 
financial constraints and the quality of corporate governance mechanisms. The hotel 
industry is chosen to investigate these effects for the following reasons. Similar to 
financially constrained firms in other industries, financially constrained hotel firms might 
retain available internal funds to undertake value-increasing investments. Unlike other 
industries, however, hotel firms expand their businesses via the franchising business 
investment model when their internal funds are not sufficient to undertake all value-
increasing projects. Although firms take on the franchising model as a means to reduce 
underinvestment problems, franchising might exacerbate overinvestment problems in 
poorly-governed hotel firms. Franchising firms generate excess cash through franchise 
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and royalty fees from their franchisees. While financially constrained firms are expected 
to undertake value-increasing projects, managers of poorly-governed firms might invest 
in negative NPV projects. Therefore, the hotel industry provides a unique setting to 
investigate of the effects of under- and overinvestment problems on the marginal value of 
cash. 
  The results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings is greater for 
financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms, which suggests that financially 
constrained firms retain more of their cash to undertake positive NPV projects that would 
have been abandoned if internal resources were insufficient. Put differently, shareholders 
of financially constrained firms place higher value on the amount of increased cash 
holdings than do shareholders of unconstrained firms. More specifically, this study finds 
that a one-dollar increase in cash holdings increases firm value between 2.59 and 5.14 
dollars in financially constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms. This finding 
likely reflects the fact that constrained firms’ shareholders perceive the greater cash 
holdings as a solution to the underinvestment problems.   
 Additionally, this study sorts firms into dictatorship (i.e., poorly-governed) and 
democracy (i.e., well-governed) portfolios to determine the extent to which the marginal 
value of cash holdings varies between poorly and well-governed firms. The results show 
that the marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy firms, 
suggesting that managers of firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms keep 
more of their cash. This result is consistent with entrenched managers increasing their 
personal wealth or other benefits by investing in negative NPV projects that would have 
been rejected if firms’ cash were insufficient. In other words, shareholders of poorly-
		112 
governed firms put lower value on the amount of increased cash holdings than do 
shareholders of well-governed firms. In particular, the marginal value of cash is 2.97 
dollars lower in firms that have more than two ATPs relative to firms that have two or 
less ATPs. It is 2.59 dollars lower in firms that have a staggered board of directors. These 
results are consistent with managers of firms being protected by ATPs so that higher 
ATPs are more often associated with poorer investment decisions and overinvestment 
problems. 
 Analyzing the marginal value of cash in financially constrained and poorly-
governed firms allows comparison of the costs of under- and overinvestment problems. 
Accordingly, this study provides indirect evidence that financial constraints 
(underinvestment problems), on average, has more effect on the marginal value of cash 
than poor corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems).   
 Although firms may expand through franchising to avoid underinvestment 
problem, franchising might intensify overinvestment problems because the availability of 
excess cash might make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. However, the 
determinants of franchising have not been previously examined from the overinvestment 
perspective. The results from preliminary analysis that does not categorize firms based on 
the degrees of financial constraints or the quality of corporate governance mechanism 
show that the marginal value of cash is negative, in which one dollar increase in cash 
decreases firm value by 7.30 dollar, for franchising firms. These results indicate that 
shareholders of franchising firms perceive that managers are likely to waste the increased 
cash in value-decreasing projects, such as investing in a company-owned division that 
has a negative NPV. This intuition is supported when the marginal value of cash in 
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franchising firms are compared with the non-franchising firms that the marginal value of 
cash is 10.98 dollar lower for franchising firms relative to non-franchising firms. 
However, when franchising firms are sorted into constrained and unconstrained and 
poorly- and well-governed categories, the results change dramatically. On the one hand, 
the marginal value of cash is 16.55 dollar higher for financially constrained franchising 
firms than unconstrained franchising firms, suggesting that shareholders of franchising 
firms put place greater value in cash because greater cash holdings allow these firms to 
expand through company-owned division by avoiding costly external finances. In other 
words, financially constrained firms retain more of their cash to expand through 
company-owned divisions rather than franchised divisions, which would have been the 
case if internal resources were insufficient. On the other hand, the marginal value of cash 
is 22.44 dollar lower for poorly-governed franchising firms than well governed 
franchising firms, which indicates that shareholders of poorly-governed franchising firms 
perceive that managers retain more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in 
negative NPV projects that would have turned down if external resources are needed. 
Accordingly, while financially constrained firms may expand through franchising to 
eliminate underinvestment problems, poorly-governed franchising firms make themselves 
vulnerable to overinvestment problems, where managers of poorly-governed franchising 
firms waste the greater cash holdings by pursuing projects that increase their wealth but 
not necessarily the shareholders.  
 The practical implications of this study are noteworthy.  While some hotel firms 
are financially constrained and hence they face underinvestment problems, majority of 
hotel firms seem to have poor governance mechanisms and hence they are subject to 
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overinvestment problems. Financially constrained hotel firms should retain more of their 
cash instead of distributing them to shareholders or expand through franchising to 
eliminate underinvestment problems. While well-governed firms could also keep more of 
their cash or expand through franchising to grow their businesses, franchising might 
exacerbate overinvestment in poorly-governed firms. That is, obtaining cash through 
franchising and royalty fees might make overinvestment easier for empire building 
CEOs, who should not have kept excess cash in the first place. These results suggest that 
both franchising and retained cash allow managers of firms to expand their operations. 
While expanding through franchising or excess cash creates value in financially 
constrained firms, stock market investor should watch for firms with more than two ATPs 
and less than five percent institutional investors, as these firms will have poor governance 
mechanisms and are likely to waste firms’ resources.  
 Despite its significant contribution to the existing corporate finance and 
franchising literature, this study is not free from limitations. Although this study provides 
significant evidence that financially constraints (underinvestment problems) has more 
effect on the firm value than weak corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment 
problems), the analyses are restricted to the analyses of the marginal value of cash 
utilizing financial constraints and corporate governance proxies. Future studies are 
needed that examine the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, the effects of capital 
expenditures on firm value, and the extent to which mergers and acquisitions affect firm 
value to corroborate the findings of this study. This study shows that franchising could be 
due to eliminate both under- and overinvestment problems by providing indirect evidence 
that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained and well-governed 
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franchising firms than for unconstrained and poorly-governed franchising firms, 
respectively. However, future studies are required to investigate the determinants of 
investments in franchising firms by analyzing the association between marginal 
investments and firm value. Also, while the results of this study can be generalizable, the 
analyses are constrained to hotel firms; hence, testing these theories in different industry 
samples could substantiate the outcomes of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, to examine why investments 
that require substantial capital, such as acquisitions, create value in some firms while they 
reduce value in other firms by examining the effects of financial constraints, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and franchising and REIT organizational forms on hotel firms’ 
investments. Second, to investigate the role of internal funds on capital investments based 
on firms’ degrees of financial constraint and exposure to empire building in the 
hospitality industry. Third, to analyze the relationship between firm value and marginal 
cash based on firms’ degrees of financial constraint and the quality of corporate 
governance mechanisms in the hotel industry to determine which one of these problems 
has more of an effect on the marginal value of cash. Figure 5.1 presents these proposed 
relationships. 
 In a perfect capital market, a positive NPV project is a value-increasing 
investment for the firm, regardless of how firms choose to finance their projects because 
the opportunity costs of external (i.e., debt and/or equity) and internal resources (i.e., 
cash) do not diverge (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, in an imperfect capital 
market, firms’ investment and financing decisions are not independent of each other. This 
dependence may result in two outcomes that are detrimental to the firm value.  
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 On the one hand, firms could face underinvestment problems if they do not have 
enough cash to undertake a positive NPV project because raising external funds increases 
the project’s cost (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
Figure 5.1 The Nomological Network: An Illustration of the Under- and Overinvestment 
Theoretical Frameworks  
Firms with underinvestment problems (i.e., financially constrained firms) retain more of 
their cash to undertake value-increasing projects and reduce underinvestment problems. 
Greater cash holdings allow financially constrained firms to undertake positive NPV 
investments that would have otherwise been abandoned due to the premium on external 
finances relative to firms’ cash. Shareholders of financially constrained firms place 
higher value in retained cash relative to shareholders of unconstrained firms,  
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 On the other hand, firms’ internal resources may create overinvestment problems 
if the manager of a firm seeks personal benefits from investing in projects beyond the 
level that maximizes firm value (Jensen, 1986). Managers of firms with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms hold more of their cash to exploit personal benefits through 
investments in value-decreasing projects. This managerial desire creates overinvestment 
problems. Shareholders of firms with weak governance mechanisms or agency problems 
place lower value in cash holdings compared to value placed by well-governed firms’ 
shareholders. 
 Although increased cash and cash flows might alleviate underinvestment 
problems, they may create overinvestment problems. Both problems depreciate firm 
value. The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly governed firms than for well-
governed firms due to agency problems (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 
2006). Parallel with these arguments, former studies have found that the marginal value 
of cash is greater for financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms due to 
asymmetric information problems (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Faulkender & Wang, 2006). 
It is evident that both underinvestment and overinvestment theories propose that the 
availability of internal funds increases investments (Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984). It is less well understood the extent to which the investment-
internal funds sensitivity varies between firms with underinvestment problems and firms 
with overinvestment problems. This dissertation examines shareholders’ reactions to 
news of acquisitions in the hotel industry to determine whether under- or overinvestment 
is a major problem in this industry. 
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 Both under- and overinvestment theories suggest that investments increase with 
the available internal funds. However, these theories have different implications. 
Investment-internal funds sensitivity and retained cash in poorly-governed firms indicate 
overinvestment problems. Conversely, this sensitivity and accumulated cash indicate 
underinvestment problems in financially constrained firms. This dissertation seeks to 
explain whether under- or overinvestment is a more detrimental problem for a firm in the 
hotel industry. 
 The hotel industry is chosen to investigate effects of under- and overinvestment 
problems for three reasons. First, building an additional hotel requires substantial capital 
investments and time. Hence, hotel firms commonly use mergers and acquisitions as a 
prevalent corporate strategy to accelerate their expansions (Canina et al., 2010). An 
acquisition could be a value-increasing or decreasing project for a firm. Second, contrary 
to the firms in other industries, such as manufacturing industries, hotel firms utilize the 
franchising investment model to expand their operations, which requires little or no 
capital investment. Franchising could be an efficient investment model for financially 
constrained hotel firms (Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Franchising could also 
make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. An investment that requires 
substantial capital spending in franchising firms could be an overinvestment because 
managers that desire to build empires may undertake value-decreasing investments with 
the excess cash holdings generated through franchising and royalty fees. Third, in 
addition to the traditional form of corporate structure (i.e., C-corporation), hotel firms 
extensively adopt the REIT organizational form, which might further affect under- and 
overinvestment problems. Unlike the C-corporation structure, hotel-REITs must 
		120 
distribute 90% of their earnings to the shareholders. Firms with agency problems may 
adopt the REIT organizational form to legally force managers to distribute most of firms’ 
income to shareholders. However, a hotel-REIT might be constrained from making 
positive NPV investments because they will be left with only 10% of their income. The 
hotel industry provides a unique setting to investigate the effects of under- and 
overinvestment problems on the firm value and investments.  
 Firms are classified into constrained and unconstrained portfolios using the KZ, 
WW, SA, and Cleary financial constraint indices to determine the extent to which firm 
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity and the marginal value of cash vary between 
constrained and unconstrained firms. The results show that financially constrained firms 
gain significantly higher returns than unconstrained firms in acquisitions, suggesting that 
acquisitions could be a way of dealing with the informational asymmetries for 
constrained firms. Firms with underinvestment problems move toward the optimal 
investment level, where the firm value is maximized, by undertaking an additional 
investment.  
 Financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do unconstrained 
firms, suggesting that financially constrained firms accumulate their internally generated 
funds to undertake value-increasing projects. These results substantiate the findings in 
previous empirical studies that examine the underinvestment theory (see e.g., Almeida et 
al., 2004; Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Fazzari et al., 1988). The findings support the 
underinvestment theory propositions that the opportunity cost of external funds is higher 
than the opportunity cost of internal funds due to informational asymmetries. Financially 
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constrained firms rely on internal funds in order to invest in positive NPV projects and 
move toward the optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized.  
 The marginal value of cash holdings is greater for financially constrained firms 
than for unconstrained firms, which suggests that financially constrained firms retain 
more of their cash to undertake positive NPV projects that would have abandoned if 
internal resources were insufficient. In other words, shareholders of financially 
constrained firms place higher value in the amount of increased cash holdings than do 
shareholders of unconstrained firms. More specifically, one dollar increase in cash 
holdings increases the firm value between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar more in financially 
constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms because constrained firms’ 
shareholders perceive the greater cash holdings as a solution to the underinvestment 
problems that arise due to the informational asymmetries. These results support the 
findings in studies that examine the underinvestment theory (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; 
Faulkender & Wang, 2006) that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially 
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. 
 In a separate set of analyses, firms are further categorized as dictatorship and 
democracy portfolios in order to determine the extent to which firm value, investment-
internal funds sensitivity, and the marginal value of cash vary between dictatorship and 
democracy firms. The results show that firms with poor governance mechanisms 
experience negative gains from acquisitions relative to the firms with better governance 
mechanisms. Managers of firms that are protected by more ATPs make poorer 
acquisitions in which they destroy value by overinvesting in negative NPV projects and 
shift firms away from the optimal investment level.  
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 Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms, which are 
exposed to empire building, than for democracy firms. The results substantiate the 
overinvestment theory propositions of Jensen (1986). Empire-building managers of firms 
with excess internal resources might make value-decreasing investments, which drive 
firms above the optimal investment level and create overinvestment problems. Although 
the overinvestment theory predicts that investment-internal funds sensitivity is higher in 
firms that are exposed to empire building, this is the first study that analyzes the 
sensitivity of investment to internal funds in this context by using recently developed 
corporate governance proxies. The findings of this dissertation advance the literature by 
providing empirical evidence that supports the theoretical arguments of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Stein (2003) that investment-internal funds sensitivity could be due 
to the managerial desire to build empires.  
 The marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy 
firms. This result suggest that managers of firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms keep more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in negative 
NPV projects. In other words, shareholders of poorly-governed firms place lower value in 
the amount of increased cash holdings than do shareholders of well-governed firms. In 
particular, the marginal value of cash is 2.97 dollar lower in firms that have more than 
two ATPs relative to firms that have two or less ATPs; and 2.59 dollar lower in firms 
with the presence of a staggered board of directors. The difference in the marginal value 
of cash between poorly and well-governed firms is due to the fact that managers of firms 
protected by more ATPs are more likely to make poorer investment decision and create 
overinvestment problems. These results complements the findings in studies that examine 
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the overinvestment theory (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006) that the 
marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy firms. 
 Analyzing the effects of financial constraints and corporate governance 
mechanisms allows the comparison of the under- and overinvestment effects on the firm 
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity, and the marginal value of cash holdings. 
These comparisons determine the extent to which under- or overinvestment problems are 
more problematic for a firm and hence show whether under- or overinvestment problems 
are more value-decreasing. Financially constrained firms allocate greater cash and cash 
flow than unconstrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems, while managers 
of dictatorship firms retain more cash and cash flow than democracy firms to build 
empires. Although both underinvestment and overinvestment problems deteriorate firm 
value, these theories have different policy implications. Underinvestment theory suggests 
that firms should retain internal funds to undertake investments, while overinvestment 
theory suggests that firms should distribute the internal funds to the shareholders and 
raise debt to undertake further investments. The results show that while one unit decrease 
in the quality of corporate governance decreases firm value by 0.8% based on BCF index, 
one unit increase in financial constraint increases firm value by 29% and 13% based on 
WW Index and SA Index, respectively. A marginal investment increases firm value more 
in underinvesting firms than it decreases firm value in overinvesting firms.  
 While the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 0.72 for financially constrained 
firms based on the Cleary index, it is 0.23 for dictatorship firms based on the block 
holdings proxy. Similarly, the sensitivity of investment to cash is 0.50 for financially 
constrained firms based on the KZ index, while it is 0.40 for dictatorship firms based on 
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the BCF index. Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially constrained 
firms than for dictatorship firms. While investments increase with the availability of 
internal funds, firms that face underinvestment problems rely more on internal funds than 
do firms with overinvestment problems. These results suggest that financially constrained 
firms use mostly internal resources for investments because of difficulties in raising 
external finance due to asymmetric information. Although dictatorship firms also retain 
internal funds for investments, these firms could raise external funds to undertake value-
increasing projects. Managers of dictatorship firms tend to use internal resources to 
undertake value-decreasing projects due to the managerial desire to build empires. This 
dissertation advances the underinvestment and overinvestment literature by showing the 
extent to which the sensitivity of investment to internal funds differs between financially 
constrained and dictatorship firms. First, the opportunity cost of external funds is higher 
than the opportunity cost of internal funds due to informational asymmetries; hence, 
financially constrained firms rely more on cash in order to invest in positive NPV 
projects. Second, managers of dictatorship firms are likely to undertake value-decreasing 
projects by retaining excess cash to build empires. Underinvestment theory suggests that 
firms should preserve more of their cash to undertake value-increasing investments and 
hence marginal cash holdings are perceived more valuable in financially constrained 
firms than unconstrained firms. The marginal value of cash holdings in financially 
constrained firms indicates the wedge between external and internal finances (i.e., the 
cost of asymmetric information), which ranges between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar. 
Overinvestment theory, however, suggests that firms should distribute the cash to 
shareholders and seek external finances to undertake additional investments and thus 
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greater cash holdings are less valued in dictatorship firms than democracy firms. The 
marginal value of cash holdings in firms with weak governance mechanisms shows the 
cost of agency problems, which fluctuates between 2.59 and 2.97 dollar. The results from 
the analyses in this dissertation provide indirect evidence that financial constraints 
(underinvestment problems), on average, have more effect on the marginal value of cash 
than poor corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems). 
 The determinants of franchising investments are also examined to test the agency 
and capital scarcity theory postulations. On the one hand, the agency theory of 
franchising posits that franchisors’ experience in developing a franchise system reduces 
the cost of franchise contracts, which decrease franchisees’ cost of free riding on the 
trademark. Firms are more likely to expand through franchising investments with 
increased experience in franchising. The agency theory of franchising also posits that the 
cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that require high levels of investments and 
hence firms will own the unit that requires high levels of investment rather than 
franchising it.  
 On the other hand, the capital scarcity theory argues that firms undertake 
franchising investment when they do not have sufficient internal resources. While 
underinvestment theory suggests that firms should abandon the projects that need 
financing beyond the available internal resources (Myers & Majluf, 1984), the capital 
scarcity theory of franchising argues that firms may expand through franchising when 
they have insufficient internal resources for financing the growth through company-
owned expansions because franchising demands no or little capital investment (Oxenfeldt 
& Thompson, 1968-1969). Previous studies that test the propositions of capital scarcity 
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theory conduct the analysis by pooling all the firms that adopt franchising in a single 
sample assuming that all firms that adopt franchising are financially constrained. In this 
dissertation, firms that adopt franchising are sorted into financially constrained and 
unconstrained categories in order to compare the extent to which constrained and 
unconstrained firms depend on internal funds to undertake franchising investments. Put 
simply, using financial constraint indices, this dissertation solves the methodological flaw 
that exists in previous empirical studies regarding the identification of firms’ financial 
constraint levels.  
 Although firms may expand through franchising to avoid underinvestment 
problem, franchising might intensify overinvestment problems because the availability of 
excess cash might make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. An investment 
that requires substantial capital expenditures in franchising firms could be an 
overinvestment if managers are not aligned with the shareholders. Empire-building CEOs 
may make value-decreasing investments with the excess cash holdings generated through 
franchising and royalty fees. The determinants of franchising have not been previously 
examined from the overinvestment perspective. This dissertation expands the franchising 
literature, first, by examining the extent to which franchising is due to financial 
constraints using indices that measure firms’ financial constraints to resolve the 
identification problem existing in previous studies; and second, by testing whether 
franchising exacerbate managerial desire to build empires.  
 The results show that shareholders of franchising companies perceive acquisitions 
negatively. Although there is a positive relationship between acquisition returns and 
degree of financial constraints, the constrained franchising indicator shows that 
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shareholders perceive acquisitions negatively. However, the coefficient of franchising 
variable loses significance and changes its sign when the interaction variable is included. 
The negative and significant coefficient of franchising suggests that the franchising firms 
overinvest. The positive and significant coefficients of lagged franchised divisions in all, 
constrained, and unconstrained firms’ samples provide evidence in favor of the agency 
theory postulation in Lafontaine (1992) that firms undertake more franchising 
investments with increased experience in franchising. The negative returns of franchising 
hotels provide support for the agency theory of franchising that monitoring cost of 
divisional managers are higher than the cost of franchisees’ to free ride on the trademark 
because the expansion of the hotel business will take place in geographic areas that are 
remotely located vis-à-vis the headquarters. The negative coefficients of relative deal size 
in all specifications fail to provide support for the agency theory of franchising that with 
increased level of investment firms will own the division rather than franchising it.  
 The relation between the proportion of franchised divisions and internal funds is 
not significant when the analysis is conducted by pooling all the firms that adopt 
franchising in a single sample. However, the relation between proportion of franchised 
divisions and cash flow is negative for financially constrained firms, suggesting that 
financially constrained firms expand through franchising when they lack internal 
resources. Conversely, the coefficients of cash and cash flow are not statistically 
significant for unconstrained firms. These firms may adopt franchising for eliminating the 
monitoring cost of divisional managers. The results from preliminary analysis that does 
not categorize firms based on the degrees of financial constraints show that the marginal 
value of cash is negative. One-dollar increase in cash decreases firm value by 7.30 dollar 
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for franchising firms. These results indicate that shareholders of franchising firms 
perceive that managers are likely to waste the increased cash in value-decreasing 
projects, such as investing in a company-owned division that has a negative NPV. This 
intuition is supported when the marginal value of cash in franchising firms are compared 
with the non-franchising firms that the marginal value of cash is 10.98 dollar lower for 
franchising firms relative to non-franchising firms. However, when franchising firms are 
sorted into constrained and unconstrained portfolios, the results change dramatically. The 
marginal value of cash is 16.55 dollar higher for financially constrained franchising firms 
than unconstrained franchising firms, suggesting that shareholders of franchising firms 
place greater value in cash because greater cash holdings allow these firms to expand 
through company-owned division by avoiding costly external finances. Financially 
constrained firms retain more of their cash to expand through company-owned divisions 
rather than franchised divisions, which would have been the case if internal resources 
were insufficient. These results support the findings in Combs and David J. (1999), which 
show that while some firms adopt franchising due to financial constraints, others may 
adopt franchising due to agency costs. Franchising firms are further sorted into poorly 
and well-governed portfolios to examine the extent to which franchising exacerbate the 
overinvestment problems. The results show that the marginal value of cash is 22.44 dollar 
lower for poorly governed franchising firms than well governed franchising firms, which 
indicates that shareholders of poorly governed franchising firms perceive that managers 
retain more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in negative NPV projects 
that would have turned down if external resources are needed. Analyses of the marginal 
value of cash in franchising firms based on the degrees of financially constraints and the 
		129 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms contributes to the explanation of 
determinants of franchising. While financially constrained firms may expand through 
franchising to eliminate underinvestment problems, poorly governed franchising firms 
make themselves vulnerable to overinvestment problems. Managers of poorly governed 
franchising firms waste excess cash holdings by pursuing projects that increase their 
wealth but not necessarily the shareholders. 
 This dissertation further investigates the effects of the REIT organizational form 
on hotel firm value and the extent to which this organizational form affects firms’ under- 
and overinvestment problems. Regardless of the degree of financial constraints and 
corporate governance mechanisms, the negative sings of REIT in all specifications 
suggests overinvestment problems. While poorly governed REIT firms’ acquisitions are 
also positively received, the constrained REIT firms’ acquisitions are perceived 
negatively. These results either imply that hotel-REITs tend to overinvest or the financial 
constraints and corporate governance indices do not well capture the constraints and 
governance. The positive sign of poorly governed REIT implies that the overinvestment 
is not due to poor corporate governance mechanisms, but rather these firms are 
financially constrained because they are over-levered or highly expanded prior to making 
acquisitions. 
 In summary, acquisitions are positively received when they indicate higher 
financial constraints that impede investments, while they are negatively viewed when 
they are an indication of empire building. The results show that investments that move 
firms toward the optimal investment level affect firm value more than investments that 
shift firms beyond the optimal investment level. On the one hand, managers of firms with 
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weak corporate governance mechanisms are likely to make poorer acquisitions by 
undertaking value-decreasing investments, which create overinvestment problems and 
move firms above the optimal investment level. Corporations need to institute external 
and internal corporate governance mechanisms to control such managerial desire. In 
particular, firms with higher ATPs should eliminate provisions and attract more 
institutional investors to increase the quality of internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms and refrain from value-decreasing acquisitions.  
 On the other hand, financially constrained firms are expected to undertake value-
increasing investments by using their internal resources to mitigate informational 
asymmetries, which create underinvestment problems and forces firms to operate below 
the optimal investment level. Financially constrained firms have limited funds but higher 
unexploited investment opportunities and thus they undertake value-increasing projects 
using internal resources or stocks. Financially constrained firms may be able to reduce 
the wedge between external and internal finance in acquisitions, where informational 
asymmetries between the acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in 
relation to the capital markets (Alshwer et al., 2011; Khatami et al., 2014). Financially 
constrained firms should make investments that require substantial capital expenditure 
through acquisitions, as acquisitions could be a method of reducing informational 
asymmetries for those firms.   
 While franchising could be an alternative method of investment to mitigate under- 
and/or overinvestment problems, the results provide evidence against the general notion 
in previous studies that examined the theories of franchising and found that franchising is 
only due to either capital constraints or agency costs (see e.g., Combs & David J., 1999; 
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Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). On the contrary, franchising firms experience 
significantly negative gains from acquisitions, suggesting that franchising could be a 
tactic for dealing with overinvestment problems. While financially constrained firms may 
fund the growth opportunities via franchising model, franchising firms should take 
restrictive actions to control managers from making acquisitions. Although there seems to 
be additional factors that might explain why unconstrained firms adopt franchising, 
postulations of the agency theory of franchising are partially supported.  
 Hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause underinvestment 
problems; however, it does eliminate overinvestment problems. These results suggest that 
distributing the free cash flows to shareholders halts managerial desire to build empires. 
These findings indicate that the firms with high payout ratio (90% in the REIT case) are 
not necessarily financially constrained, as opposed to the findings in J. Kim and Jang 
(2012) that use Tobin’s Q, which is an inferior proxy in capturing financial constraints 
and thus it could be misleading (Whited & Wu, 2006), to classify firms as financially 
constrained and unconstrained.  
 The findings of this dissertation provide support for the financial constraints 
indices of the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ), the Whited and Wu (2006) (WW), the 
Size and Age (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010) (SA), and the Cleary (Hennessy & Whited, 2007) 
in terms of measuring firms degrees of financial constraints. Also, this dissertation 
complements the corporate governance proxies developed by Bebchuk et al. (2006), 
Cremers and Nair (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) in terms of the efficacy of 
these proxies to measure the managerial desire to build empires. This dissertation fails to 
provide support for the presence of a staggered board, which is recommended by 
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Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), as a proxy for exposure to empire building or corporate 
governance. 
 The results of this dissertation have practical implications. These findings may 
help guide managers to allocate internal resources efficiently based on the degrees of 
financial constraint and exposure to empire building, and ultimately to adjust investments 
based on optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized. Firms may 
improve investment policies and expanding through different investment models, such as 
franchising, and whether to register as C-corporation or REITs. The results also give 
guidance to shareholders on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in controlling 
managers’ empire-building preferences. Hospitality firms should allocate internal 
resources efficiently based on the degree of financial constraints and exposure to empire 
building to adjust investments to reach the optimal investment level, where the firm value 
is maximized. On the one hand, firms with overinvestment problems should eliminate the 
number of ATPs to increase the quality of external governance mechanism. Reducing the 
number of ATPs will not only increase the quality of external governance mechanism, 
but it may also drive more institutional investors to the firm, which increases the quality 
of internal governance and controls managerial desire to build empires. Increased quality 
of internal and external governance will force managers to distribute the internal 
resources to the shareholders and to raise external funds for undertaking positive NPV 
projects. In particular, institutional shareholders create block holdings within the 
company with their voting power, which enhances the quality of internal governance 
mechanism. Improved internal and external governance mechanisms could impose the 
distribution of the excess cash to shareholders and hence managers will be forced to seek 
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external finances to undertake positive NPV projects. Pursuing external finances for a 
project through debt or equity markets will institute an additional control mechanism on 
managers, as these markets will not fund a negative NPV project.  
 On the other hand, financially constrained firms should retain their internal funds 
to finance all the positive NPV projects to alleviate the informational asymmetries and to 
reach the optimal investment level. This dissertation further contributes to an explanation 
of the capital scarcity and agency theory of franchising by examining determinants of 
franchising investments in hotel firms. Firms adopt franchising due to both capital 
scarcity and agency cost, suggesting that franchising could be a way of dealing with 
asymmetric information and the monitoring cost of divisional managers. Financially 
constrained hotel firms may expand through the franchising model when they lack 
internal resources to undertake value-increasing projects. Financially constrained firms in 
other industries with growth prospects should expand through franchising when they 
have insufficient cash to undertake positive NPV projects to avoid the costly external 
finances because franchising does not require substantial capital investment.  
 Corporations could adopt franchising as an additional corporate governance 
mechanism to solve overinvestment problems. Put simply, managers of franchising firms 
might be less likely to waste the marginal cash in value-decreasing projects because 
financing the growth through franchised divisions does not demand major capital 
expenditures and thus managers are expected to distribute the marginal cash to 
shareholders because these firms could raise external funds to expand through company-
owned divisions if the project has a positive NPV. However, franchising alone is not 
sufficient to resolve overinvestment problems, rather it could be used as an additional 
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corporate strategy to improve the corporate governance mechanism of a firm. While 
hotel-REITs are more likely to make value-increasing investments, improvement of 
external corporate governance mechanism in hotel-REITs could make this corporate 
structure more efficient than C-corporation hotels. 
 Although the findings of this dissertation make significant contributions to the 
corporate finance, franchising, and hospitality literature, this dissertation is not free from 
limitations. While this dissertation reports significant evidence that underinvestment is 
more depreciating than overinvestment, the analyses are limited to gains from 
acquisitions. Future studies may examine the effects of different investments on the firm 
value. Although this dissertation provides significant evidence that financial constraint 
(underinvestment problems) has more effect on the firm value than weak corporate 
governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems), future studies are needed to examine 
the effects of capital expenditures on the firm value to corroborate the findings of this 
dissertation. In a model where market share is considered as an investment, Chevalier 
(1995) showed that managers with a desire to build empires could overinvest in the 
market share. While increasing the market share increases the sales and ultimately 
benefits the managers, it may not benefit the shareholders. Firms that adopt the 
franchising business investment model might be overinvesting in the market share by 
increasing the number of franchised divisions. Future studies may investigate the 
franchising firms’ overinvestment behavior on the market share. The determinants of 
capital investments in firms that adopt franchising are examined to test the agency and 
capital scarcity theories of franchising. Future research is needed to investigate the 
determinants of franchising investment. Future studies may investigate the determinants 
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of investments in franchising firms by analyzing the association between marginal 
investments and firm value. While the results of this dissertation can be generalizable, the 
analyses are constrained to hotel firms. Testing the underinvestment, overinvestment, and 
franchising theories using different samples of industries would substantiate the results of 
this dissertation. The results from the OLS analysis that examines the effects of corporate 
governance on the firm value yield low Adjusted R-square values. Although these low 
values could be seen as a limitation or constraints due to small sample size, studies in 
corporate finance literature that examines these issues reports similar results. Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007), who has developed the internal corporate governance index using 
3,950 observations, report R-square values of 0.02 and 0.04. Therefore, the small 
numbers are not due to small sample sizes. Rather, these low values are due to the nature 
of such studies. Although unobservable effects of firms’ financial policies and investment 
opportunities might create omitted variable bias, firms’ investment and financial policies 
and investment opportunities are not disclosed because of the crucial competition factors 
that determine a firm’s success. Instead, alternative proxies are used to capture firms’ 
policies from information available to the public. Yet, corporate finance studies may still 
have low explanatory powers due to the possible omitted variables. Therefore, future 
models employing additional explanatory, macro and firm level, variables might improve 
the explained variance.  
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